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Engineering the Modern Administrative State:
Political Accommodation and Legal Strategy in the
New Deal Era*
Daniel B. Rodriguez**
Barry R. Weingast***
Administrative constitutionalism in the United States has
been characterized by tension and accommodation. The tension
reflects the unsettled nature of our constitutional scheme,
especially with regard to separation of powers, and also the
concern with agency discretion and performance. Still and all, we
have accommodated administrative constitutionalism in
fundamental ways, through a constitutional jurisprudence that,
in the main, accepts broad delegations of regulatory power to the
bureaucracy and an administrative law that oversees agency
actions under procedural and substantive guidelines. This was
not always the case. In this Article, part one of a larger project, we
revisit the critical New Deal period to look at the strategies the
Congress and the Supreme Court used to resolve controversies
over the emerging administrative state. We see the political and
legal accommodation as a product of a (mostly) coherent
interbranch dialogue, iterative and fueled by strategy. Having
surmounted some important roadblocks in the first New Deal, this
effort ultimately resulted in a scheme that enabled the federal
government to accomplish their three critical objectives: to deploy
national power to solve new economic problems, to create
delegations appropriate to modern needs, and to craft novel
administrative instruments to carry out legislative aims—all of
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which required a due amount of legal accommodation, given
extant legal doctrine and the interests of the courts.
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INTRODUCTION
The long-standing issue of how the modern administrative state
emerged from the Sturm und Drang of politics on the one hand and
the complex architecture of traditional legal doctrine on the other
remains a central question for public law scholarship.1 Many of our
1. See, e.g., DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014); 1 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960 THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, at 216 (1st reprtg. 1992); G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 13–32 (2000); BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
(1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Mark Tushnet,
Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory,
60 DUKE L.J. 1565 (2011); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007); Laura Kalman, Law,
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leading legal historians have turned their great talents to this
question.2 Standard wisdom notwithstanding, we revisit this
perennial topic in part because no consensus exists as to how to
answer this question.3
The standard wisdom about the major legal controversies of the
New Deal separates constitutional law issues from administrative
law issues into two non-overlapping categories, like two silos that
operate with complete independence. This separation in part
reflects the notion that the foundation of administrative law is
statutory, not constitutional; hence administrative law lies outside
the constitutional domain. We argue that this separation is artificial
and misleading.
This separation causes both constitutional law scholars and
administrative law scholars to miss important aspects of the legal
controversies from Crowell v. Benson (1932) through the New Deal—
namely, the necessity of invention, of establishing a new, routine
process for issuing sovereign commands via administration. As of
January 1, 1930, this process did not exist. By WWII it was solidly
Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time
and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 1891 (1994).
2. In addition to sources cited in supra note 1, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995). Moreover, the
primary and secondary questions in this vein appear with more or less prominence in books
and articles that focus on contemporary legal doctrine. For example, Gillian Metzger’s recent
Harvard Foreword recurs to the New Deal period to articulate anew the case for a wellfortified consensus view of the durability of administrative constitutionalism. Gillian E.
Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). Calling
the administrative state “constitutionally obligatory,” she notes that these legislative
delegations of power to agencies “are here to stay.” Id. at 72. To be sure, the modern literature
does not want for full-throated critiques of the administrative state, looking with particular
ire at the world wrought by the New Deal’s accommodation to broad administrative power.
See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); D.A. Candeub,
Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49 (2017); Richard A. Epstein, The Perilous
Position of the Rule of Law and the Administrative State, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2013).
However, the constitutional objections have largely been resolved in favor of administrative
constitutionalism, and there is little reason to believe that even the most vigorous
contemporary attacks on the “dark state” will unwind this situation. See Adrian Vermeule,
Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2465 n.3 (2017) (comparing administrative state skepticism to “believing in UFOs or
watching dystopian movies”); see also EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING
POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The
Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (2018).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 26–42.
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in place. Part of the question was how, if at all, the rule of law was
to be extended to administrative regulation. We argue that a major
part of the controversy between the Supreme Court and the New
Deal was a negotiation, even if tacit, over this issue—the
framework for extending constitutional rights of due process. The
constitutional solution was the invention of procedural due
process, which emerged from tacit negotiations between elected
officials and the courts. Indeed, the solution emerged from an
implicit political accommodation (or an “implicit contract,” to use
law and economics terminology) whereby political officials
retained control over the content of regulation while courts ensured
that the administrative process met conditions of due process,
which came to have a procedural basis.
We launch our argument with the “internalists,” the scholars
who emphasize the doctrinal elements of these constitutional
controversies, rather than the political considerations. We agree
with their criticism of the standard wisdom, arguing that
traditional externalist scholarship of the New Deal fails to account
for the changing nature of the issues over the course of the New
Deal. Put simply, the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)
and the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are very
different statutes, raising different issues and therefore prompting
a different reaction by the courts. Instead of seeing Jones & Laughlin
Steel4 as a capitulation, they argue that the issues had changed.
We nonetheless depart from the revisionists in three ways. They
miss, first, the necessity for the New Deal to invent a new basis for
administrative law that both the courts and elected officials qua
New Dealers could accept. Second, the dialogic nature of the
evolution of doctrine and legislative practice. Third, the deep
connection between the constitutional settlements of the New Deal
and administrative law.
To begin, our argument has five steps:
First, we focus on the Crowell decision in 1932.5 This case is one
of the foundational stones in the administrative law edifice:
regulatory agency rulings have the force of law, so long as an
Article III court has the authority to oversee the regulatory process.
A necessary condition for building the American administrative
4. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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state, this decision reveals how formless and inchoate
administrative law was on the eve of the New Deal.
Second, early New Dealers explicitly ignored constitutional
issues, to their detriment.6 The NIRA proved a dual failure with the
Court. Proponents of the standard wisdom miss both aspects of this
failure: (i) an absence of any attempt to adopt any of the
constitutional prescriptions involved in prior regulatory legislation
approved by courts, and (ii) the absence of any credible attempt to
protect citizens from abuse of their rights by the National
Recovery Administration.
Third, with respect to the early New Deal cases, notably
Schechter Poultry (1935)7 and Panama Refining (1935),8 the standard
wisdom fails to provide an adequate account of the Court’s
opinion. True, the Supreme Court ruled the NIRA unconstitutional.
But Panama Refining and especially Schechter Poultry did far more.
They articulated a “how-to manual” of sorts—that is, a set of
instructions for Congress to follow in order to ensure that
administrative discretion would be properly cabined and channeled.
These requirements were a quid pro quo for constitutional validity,
even if this point was made tacitly, not explicitly.
Fourth, the NLRA became the absolutely pivotal event in the
creation of administrative law during the New Deal. This act was
not just another New Deal statute of the first-100-days ilk, but
a regulatory statute unlike any before it. It became the model
for administrative regulation based on procedural due process.
Importantly from our perspective, the Act met the Court’s
prescriptions of the “how-to manual” by detailing a set of elaborate
procedures for the agency to follow in order to implement
public policy.
Fifth, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the NLRA in Jones &
Laughlin Steel was not a capitulation, as the standard wisdom holds,
but an affirmation. A comparison of the portions of Schechter
Poultry ignored by the conventional explanation with Chief Justice
Hughes’s opinion in Jones & Laughlin Steel demonstrates that he is
not articulating a new principle, as the “switch in time” standard
wisdom holds. Chief Justice Hughes not only declares the NLRA

6. See infra text accompanying notes 145–47.
7. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
8. Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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constitutional, but he explains to Congress that they got it right;
Hughes approves of the Act because it meets the strictures of the
“how-to manual,” which he then repeats.9 We therefore see a
dialogue between the Court and Congress. Congress writes
legislation in the first 100 days without regard to constitutional
issues, notably in NIRA. The Court not only rules this Act
unconstitutional, but it develops at length the “how-to manual.”
Congressional drafters of the next round of legislation work hard
to structure the NLRA based on past precedent. When the Court
issues Schechter Poultry, we see that the NLRA drafters anticipated
most of the “how-to manual.” The Supreme Court then approves
in Jones & Laughlin Steel.
The standard wisdom in constitutional law, dominant for
eighty years, relies too heavily on President Franklin Roosevelt’s
view, a view developed for political purposes and therefore one
that we need to treat skeptically. The triumph of the New Deal did
not result from the bulldozing of a defenseless Supreme Court by
the lions. Instead, it was at once a political accommodation of the
elected and judicial branches that to this day dominates how the
nation evaluates regulatory decision-making. It is the model statute
of procedural due process.
The political accommodation involved two constitutional
aspects, one widely recognized, the other utterly unrecognized. The
portion largely recognized involves the Commerce Clause. Per the
standard story, the Court considerably relaxed the constraints
imposed by the Commerce Clause on national government
regulation in Jones & Laughlin Steel. Prior to that case, Commerce
Clause jurisprudence was a mess. Different cases emphasized
different tests, seeming to produce contradictory results. In Jones &
Laughlin Steel, the Supreme Court clarified and systematized
Commerce Clause doctrine, choosing the most permissive of the
previous tests.
The second and largely unrecognized aspect of the political
accommodation involved the Courts’ acceptance that
administrative law would have a statutory, not constitutional basis.
We see this basis in the “how-to manual,” in the Court’s acceptance
of the NLRA in Jones & Laughlin Steel, and in the landmark

9. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 31. See generally infra text accompanying
notes 189–92.

152

3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

153

2/9/2021 9:08 PM

Engineering the Modern Administrative State

Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. In principle, the Court could
have articulated a constitutional basis for administrative
procedures, affording it a stronger hand in protecting citizen rights.
But the Court chose not to do so. Leading administrative law
scholars, including Adrian Vermeule in his important recent book,
Law’s Abnegation, interprets this choice of statutory basis as part of
the courts’ internally driven abnegation.10 Our argument suggests
otherwise. This statutory basis for administrative law is a central
component of the political accommodation on granting political
officials the means to control regulatory policy while the courts
enforce a system of procedural due process.
We focus here as well on the administrative law that emerged
from the New Deal, this accompanying the Court’s blockbuster
constitutional decisions. The literature lacks a compelling and
unified story that ties together the so-called New Deal revolution
in federal power and administrative constitutionalism with the
emergence of meaningful administrative law in the 1930s and
1940s. Instead, we have two more or less separate narratives, one
focusing on the constitutional law struggles over the scope of the
commerce power and the nondelegation doctrine, and the other
focusing on the newly emerging administrative law, even though
the two sets of events were unfolding simultaneously as part of a
single political process.11
The conventional constitutional law narrative takes us from the
skepticism of pre–New Deal conservative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to the stark rejection of legislative delegation
reflected in the NIRA and then to the remarkable events of
1936–37, where the Court appears to shift course suddenly, from a

10. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016).
11. We say “newly emerging” advisably, given what we know to be important
elements of administrative law that happened before—in some respects, long before—the
New Deal period. Jerry Mashaw’s magisterial work on administrative regulation during the
founding period is a useful and compelling antidote to the notion that administrative law
was invented in the 1930s. JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION:
THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). Still and all, we
regard the 1930s as a seminal epoch in the development of both regulatory administration
and administrative law. In this we agree with many administrative law scholars, perhaps
beginning with Freund, continuing with Frankfurter, Landis, and other exponents of an
expanded form of administrative regulation, and continuing to scholars of the present day.
See HORWITZ, supra note 1.
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stubborn rejection to an unequivocal embrace of New Deal
regulatory power.12
The administrative law narrative is more opaque.
Administrative agencies, emerging during the Progressive Era,13
grow in substance and in prominence in the 1930s. A long series of
questions confronted the Supreme Court concerning the
appropriate scope of agency power. This confrontation arose at
multiple levels, including separation of powers, of fidelity to rules
of fair agency procedure, and the scope of administrative agency
power to find facts, apply law to facts, and interpret statutes. In
many ways, the signal case in this emerging New Deal
administrative law is Crowell v. Benson (1932)14 decided on the eve
of the New Deal, where the Court took a major step in favor of
administrative power.15 Other linchpins of the modern
12. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 73 (1941) (concluding
that “the outcome of the election of 1936” was important “in inducing the Justices . . . to
restudy their position”); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND
HIS LEGACY 223 (1995) (explaining that the Court “beat[] a strategic retreat . . . largely in
response to the Court-packing plan”); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME
COURT 117 (6th ed. 2016) (stating that “it is hard to doubt that” FDR’s landslide victory in
the 1936 presidential election and his court-packing scheme “played a part in the new tone
of judicial decision that began to be sounded in the early months of” 1937); CARL B. SWISHER,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1943); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942); ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 342–43 (suggesting that
the Court in 1937 “eliminate[d] the risk of hostile Article Five amendment by unequivocally
recognizing the constitutional legitimacy of the New Deal vision of activist government”);
Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms the Social Contract, reprinted in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 11–12 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E.
Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) (citing the 1937 “switch” as an example of how
courts “legitimate the changes” in “the nature of the social compact”); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin
M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 (2010) (empirical analysis
of Justice Roberts’s move leftward during the 1936 Term); Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1057–58 (2000)
[hereinafter Friedman, Countermajoritarian] (noting that the New Deal was a “time[] in
history . . . when politics appeared to influence the Court, and may well have done so”);
Friedman, supra note 1. For a good survey of some of the more recent literature, see Barry
Cushman, The Jurisprudence of the Hughes Court: The Recent Literature, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1929 (2014). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42 (1991) (“[A]ll
lawyers recognize that the 1930s mark the definitive constitutional triumph of activist
national government.”).
13. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 126–31 (1982); Robert L. Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
14. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
15. See VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 25–29 (describing Crowell as a “sweeping attempt
to mediate the conflict between law and the administrative state in general terms”).
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administrative state include Schechter Poultry v. United States,16 St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,17 Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Chenery,18 and the Morgan cases.19 In all these cases,
Schechter Poultry included, the Court put forth standards for
agencies to follow to ensure fidelity to an emerging conception of
the rule of law in the administrative law.20 This era, beginning with
the New Deal and continuing to the enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) just fourteen years later,21
defined for the years to come the acceptable nature and scope of
administrative power under our American constitutional scheme.22
Seldom do scholars focus on the ways that these two lines of
precedent come together, and rare is the book or article that
endeavors to connect the blockbuster constitutional law
movements of the New Deal period—what scholars from Edward
Corwin23 to William Leuchtenburg24 to Bruce Ackerman25 call a
“constitutional revolution”—with the birth of modern
administrative law. Yet, understanding the connections between
New Deal constitutionalism and administrative law are essential to
a deeper and broader understanding for the ways in which the
courts, Congress, and the President worked to develop a structure

16. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
17. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
18. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
19. These refer to four cases decided by the Supreme Court within a half-decade. See
Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468 (1936); Morgan v. United States (Morgan II),
304 U.S. 1 (1938); United States v. Morgan (Morgan III), 307 U.S. 183 (1939); United States v.
Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
20. Cutting matters off at the time of the APA is, to be sure, somewhat arbitrary. While
we do not focus closely on post-APA developments in this paper, we do note that some of
the more significant steps toward a “fair procedure” model of administrative law are the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), and other
cases related to the standards of significant evidence and the meaning of on-the-record
proceedings. In the next part of this project, we will turn to these and other bellwether cases
and illuminating steps in the development of post–New Deal administrative law.
21. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). On the
origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, see George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).
22. As Ernst summarizes this development: “Administrators exercised great
discretionary power but only if they treated individuals fairly and kept within limits
imposed by Congress and the Constitution.” ERNST, supra note 1, at 7.
23. See CORWIN, supra note 12, at 64.
24. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 2, at 213.
25. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 352–53.
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of regulatory administration suited to the difficult economic and
social problems that would come to characterize modern industrial
society. Putting these political episodes and doctrinal
developments into two separate boxes, one for constitutional
historians and scholars and the other for the intrepid group of
administrative law scholars has been counterproductive. Instead,
we need to integrate these two separate stories. We explain how
politics and law factored in the emergence of a novel approach to
regulatory administration. In its novelty, key constitutional
controversies arose. And it was in the settling of these
controversies, settlement which required both political and
doctrinal interventions, that the modern administrative state
was created.
Looking anew at this critical period in American legal
development, we advance a thesis that navigates between the
conventional externalist story and the internalist, court-centric
story of public law’s origins and impact during and after this era.
The first story sees the ratification of broad congressional power
under the Constitution as a concession to external political
pressure—an idea captured memorably in the phrase “a switch in
time saved nine.”26 In this account, administrative power in the
latter New Deal period and afterward was more or less inevitable;
it followed in due course from the Court’s caving in to political
influence, a surrender that explains, too, the steady rise of
administrative agency power and impact in the post-War period.
This approach sees the epoch as a pitched battle between two views
of American constitutionalism and administrative discretion and,
thanks largely to the intervention of President Roosevelt and the
defanging of the conservative resistance in the wake of these wave
elections in 1932 and especially 1936, the winners enjoyed the
spoils.27 Needless to say, this story is abidingly zero-sum: Will the
Court triumph in forestalling the New Deal? Or will FDR and his
progressive vision of a society prevail?
26. The switch in the voting of one justice turned a 5-4 majority against the New Deal
into a 5-4 majority in favor of the New Deal, thereby forestalling FDR’s threat to pack the
Supreme Court. The quotation is associated with Professor Thomas Reed Powell. On
Powell’s contemporaneous evaluation of the Court in this era, see John Braeman, Thomas
Reed Powell on the Roosevelt Court, 5 CONST. COMMENT 143, 183 (1988).
27. For a contemporaneous, if somewhat breathless, depiction of this era that reflects
a strong externalist perspective, see CHARLES P. CURTIS, JR., LIONS UNDER THE THRONE: A
STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1947).
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The other story, sometimes called revisionist, is of more recent
origins and, while less influential, does provide a different account
of the Court’s decision making in the key constitutional cases.
Richard Friedman28 and Barry Cushman29 propound a thesis that
can fairly be seen as internalist,30 that is, as insisting that the Court’s
decisions upholding in some circumstances federal authority under
the Commerce Clause, then famously in the cases involving the
NIRA striking down federal legislation as unconstitutional
delegations of legislative power, and then finally upholding the
linchpin statutes of the New Deal, can largely be explained on
doctrinal terms. This is not to say that external political factors were
deemed irrelevant, but rather that it is a vast oversimplification to
view these decisions as unmoored from doctrine and as merely
political. From a doctrinal perspective, not all New Deal cases were
alike. This observation provides the key to understanding the
emergence of the political accommodation.
By contrast, the story of administrative law’s emergence is
sketchier. Yet, here too an internalist/externalist dichotomy
persists. For prominent administrative law scholars looking back at
this period, including Louis Jaffe and Kenneth Culp Davis, as well
as contemporary legal scholars,31 the solutions to the difficult
problems of administrative discretion lie in nuanced legal doctrine,
building on, but not limited to, the fundamental architecture of the
APA.32 Judicial review would be the answer to the discretion

28. See Friedman, supra note 1.
29. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1; Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV.
201 (1994).
30. Following the description by Kalman, supra note 1, at 2165–66, which she attributes
to Cushman. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 3–7. The dueling accounts of the standard and
revised stories have been described as “a divide that has long separated historians of the
New Deal: internalists who emphasize gradual doctrinal evolution, and externalists who
emphasize the causal power of dramatic political events.” Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for
Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 728 (2016) (reviewing ERNST, supra note 1).
31. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State:
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1,
12–18, 53–66 (2000); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification
Critique of Judicial Review, 69 OHIO STATE L.J. 251 (2009).
32. This is the overarching theme of Professor Jaffe’s classic treatise. LOUIS L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965). Professor Davis’s comprehensive,
albeit eccentric, treatise also valorizes the capacity of judges to supervise administrative
agencies, thereby properly channeling and limiting administrative discretion. See 1 KENNETH
C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978); 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS,

157

3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/9/2021 9:08 PM

46:1 (2020)

conundrum; and this doctrine, viewed principally as judge-made,33
would emerge as mechanisms to control and channel
administrative power. The externalist perspective looks more
skeptically at the avowed autonomy of law and legal doctrine.34 It
sees the answer to administrative discretion largely in political
control and oversight.35 Presaging the Supreme Court’s opinions by
four decades in seminal administrative law cases such as Vermont
Yankee36 and State Farm,37 the idée fixe among externalists here is that
agency discretion can be limited truly only by political
interventions and structural limits.38 Administrative law, in this
account, is essentially politics by other means.39
We find neither the internalist nor externalist accounts of
constitutional and administrative law a satisfactory rendering of
the complicated political and legal episodes of that key era.40
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1979); see also KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES (1976).
33. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Law as Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 113 (1998); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe’s Law: Reflections on a Generation of Administrative
Law Scholarship, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997).
34. For a skeptical view of the role and motivations of the courts in reviewing
administrative agency decision-making, see MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988).
35. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking,
85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999).
36. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
37. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
38. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2005); Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
39. Lest we exaggerate this divide among what we are calling internalists and
externalists in administrative law, a growing number of influential administrative law
scholars are negotiating the political and legal elements of administrative law and looking at
multiple mechanisms for controlling agencies. Some of the most important of this work is
empirical in focus, and from this work we learn much about the actual structure and strategy
of administrative agency performance. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (2017); Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency
Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative
State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004). A classic early statement of this reconciliation between more
internalist and externalist views is Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and
Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1251 (1992).
40. Not that we are the first to undertake this effort. Ackerman characterized his effort
as an effort to drop “the old and tired debate” between internalist and externalist
perspectives. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 343; see Kalman, supra note 1, at 2165–66.
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Politics mattered, but so too did law and legal doctrine. We argue
that Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court engineered
the modern administrative state through a political
accommodation in which each institution accomplished important
objectives, albeit unsteadily and with the challenges emerging from
legal constraints and the yin and yang of political and legal
strategy. The success of regulatory administration in the New Deal
and post–New Deal eras required deft legislative and presidential
strategy. But it also required substantial legal innovation, that is,
the development and application of new legal rules and guidelines
that would thread the needle of endorsing broad, novel federal
regulation while also ensuring that agencies would recognize and
respect the rule of law. To be sure, administrative constitutionalism
was not created from scratch during the New Deal; nor was
administrative law largely an invention of the Hughes Court.41
However, the creation by Congress of new techniques for
delegating administrative power along with new legal strategies to
limit such power represented major advances. In just a few short
years, we argue, the elements of modern administrative law
emerged as a product of the mutual political accommodation
engineered by Congress, the President, and the courts during the
constitutional controversies.
Our project here is to fill two lacunae in the extensive literature,
one concerning some key doctrinal developments in both
constitutional law and administrative law, the other concerning a
theoretical explanation—forged through the application of positive
political theory42—of the engineering of the administrative state.
In addition to Ernst, cited above, we note Mark Tushnet and Cass Sunstein as fellow travelers
along this road to deconstructing the internalist/externalist debate and looking anew at the
New Deal and the emergence of a new administrative constitutionalism. See Tushnet, supra
note 1; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).
41. See MASHAW, supra note 11; Rabin, supra note 13.
42. See, e.g., Rui DeFiguerido, Tonja Jacobi & Barry R. Weingast, The New Separationof-Powers Approach to American Politics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY
(Donald A. Wittman & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2006); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003); Pablo T. Spiller, A Positive
Political Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law, or Regulatory
Specificity, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (1996); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994); William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I,
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In Part I, we set the table for our discussion of the New Deal
struggle by focusing on the context—political and legal— which the
Court faced as it considered key New Deal statutes, both in the first
term of the Roosevelt administration—what is often labelled the
“First New Deal”—and in cases beginning in the 1935 term. In Part
II, we consider the Court’s constitutional analysis in two principal
doctrinal areas—the nondelegation issue and the constitutionality
of agency decision-making in the adjudicatory context.
The concluding Part III explains how our thesis provides a
meaningful new perspective on this well-trod subject, a perspective
which helps us to better understand the political accommodation
that undergirds the engineering of the modern administrative state.
We also preview later work on this general subject.
I. REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION AT THE CUSP OF THE NEW DEAL
A comprehensive survey of the economic, social, and political
history of the early twentieth century as relevant context for the
emergence of regulatory administration is well beyond the scope of
this article. Historical exegeses on this period have usefully set the
table and the terms of the debate.43 What we can see clearly from
the wide and deep historiography of the fifty years between the
Progressive and New Deal eras is that our national political
institutions, and especially Congress, worked deliberately, albeit
with both successful and failed experiments, to craft appropriate
administrative institutions to tackle the new and vexing problems
that were arising in this rapidly changing nation. Fundamentally,
the national government needed to expand its capacity to act
effectively, and it needed to mobilize institutional strategies to
carry out its developing objectives.44 To understand the political
accommodation with respect to New Deal regulatory
administration, we need to understand a bit about the predicament
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to
Administrative Procedures, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 307 (1990); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G.
Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
43. See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY (1990); HORWITZ, supra
note 1; JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1982).
44. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937
(1991); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910, 10 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 57 (1975).
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in both politics and law, and about the strategies emerging to tackle
both systematically and simultaneously.45
In this Part, we frame the basic strategic issues facing Congress
and the courts respectively. For Congress (and also the President),
the question was how to construct a proper regulatory apparatus
which would function to solve key problems in economic
regulation. Solutions would lie in new administrative techniques—
a new kind of bureaucracy. These strategies would build on key
elements of the Progressive Era edifice, including the Interstate
Commerce Act and its progeny, and also federal regulations in
trade, food, and drugs. However, new problems called for
imaginative new architecture. For the courts, the heart of the
dilemma was how to reconcile these new regulatory innovations
with constitutional doctrine, particularly with regard to the
commerce power and separation of powers.
A. The Emerging Administrative State and the Legal Landscape
The burden of defining the scope and contours of federal
regulatory administration fell squarely on the shoulders of
Congress. Yet, key legislative decisions took place here, as before
and after, in the shadow of judicial review. This insight is critical to
any positive political theory of legislation; and, indeed, is common
sense. Congress could push its agenda only so far as courts were
willing to permit.
The story of how the Court accommodated congressional
assertions of power under the Commerce Clause is well known; it
is featured prominently in the constitutional law casebooks and
treatises and is commonplace in the scholarly literature on
emerging federal regulation in the period between the Progressive
Era of the late 19th century and the conclusion of the New Deal.
Less attended to are the two questions which are central to
congressional choices about the regulatory instruments it designed

45. While our analysis in this section does not represent a deep dive into the
considerable historiography on law, economic development, and governmental capacity—
again, a task beyond the scope of this paper—we are conscious of the extraordinarily rich
work of the most prominent legal historians who have valuably looked at the nexus between
legal doctrine, legal theory, and economic conditions. See, e.g., J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND
THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1959); 2 MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (reprt. 1992); HORWITZ,
supra note 1; Scheiber, supra note 44.
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to implement federal economic and social policy during this era—
first, the limits, if any, on the scope of federal delegation of power;
and, second, the bureaucracy’s power to make decisions in
administrative adjudication. The Commerce Clause question is
fundamentally different from these second two questions; the
former implicates constitutional rules concerning federalism while
the other concerns the Constitution’s separation of powers.
1. Delegation of power
Congress’s dilemma as it embarked on its task to regulate many
parts of the economy in the pursuit of better market integration was
how properly to structure legislative delegation. In one
fundamental sense, that ship had sailed with the enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, for there Congress had given an
independent agency, the new Interstate Commerce Commission,
broad administrative authority to implement the charges of the Act.
And while the federal courts may well have been, as James Ely, Jr.,
puts it, “dubious about an administrative body that was an
uncertain fit in the constitutional system as traditionally
understood,”46 no serious challenge was raised to Congress’s
authority to enact the statute under the Constitution. Indeed, the
central question of the constitutionality of creating these so-called
independent agencies would await 1935, when the Court decided
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.47
Nonetheless, the Court did indeed grapple with matters of
constitutional power in the three decades between the turn of the
century and the New Deal. In United States v. Grimaud,48 decided in
1911, the Court upheld the provisions of a federal statute which
delegated certain powers to the United States Forest Service. This
was not, said the Court, a delegation of legislative authority—a
decision which would raise concerns under the Constitution’s
separation of powers, but the acceptable exercise of administrative
authority under the executive power in Article I.49 As such, it was,

46. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Troubled Beginning of the Interstate Commerce Act, 95 MARQ.
L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012).
47. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
48. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
49. See id.
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as in Field v. Clark50 decided nearly two decades earlier, not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President.
The Court’s most extensive treatment of the delegation issue
came close to the New Deal era, when it decided J.W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States.51 The Court in 1928 considered the
constitutionality of the Tariff Commission, an entity whose name is
fairly self-explanatory in that it was created as part of a statute
which accorded the President greater authority, acting through this
commission, to levy tariffs in order to combat foreign powers’
efforts to impose costs on American products. Significantly, the
Commission was obliged to follow a series of administrative
procedures, including a version of what would become “noticeand-comment rulemaking” in the APA enacted two decades later.
In Hampton, the Court offers what to that time was the most
comprehensive exegesis on the nature and scope of delegated
legislative power. “Delegata potestas non potest delegari” (power may
not be delegated), grandly declares the Court, noting that this
maxim has force within the structure of our constitutional scheme
of separation of powers.52 Legislative delegation of this sort is
contemplated by our Constitutional system, for “Congress has
found it frequently necessary to use officers of the Executive
Branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by
its acts of legislation.”53 And it can do so “by vesting discretion in
such officers.”54
Critically, however, Congress cannot delegate to an
administrative agency the discretion to make laws.55 The legislature
must set out the appropriate standards, and the executive branch
(here the Court accepting without much reasoning that the
50. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). In Field, the Court considered a delegation to
the president to set tariffs under the McKinley Act. “That congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President,” said the Court, “is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”
Id. at 692. However, this action by the President “was not the making of law,” but rather
empowered the executive branch to serve as a “mere agent” of Congress. Id. at 693.
51. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
52. Id. at 405–06.
53. Id. at 406.
54. Id.
55. Earlier twentieth century cases in which the Court grappled with the question of
proper constitutional delegation include United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911);
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); and Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U.S. 470 (1904).
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implementation of regulation is to be regarded as quintessentially
an executive function under Article I) is limited to effectuating
congressional purpose by executing these laws, a scheme of
execution that is facilitated by a proper degree of discretion. The
result turns on what the Court sees as basically a statutory fact, that
is, that “this Act did not in any real sense invest the President with
the power of legislation, because nothing involving the expediency
or just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of
the President.”56
Hampton is a strange animal. The Court’s acceptance of
congressional action here does not turn in any real sense on a
judgment about commerce power; nor does it really entail a firm
elucidation of the separation of powers, that is, between what is a
legislative versus an executive function. Rather, the Court waxes on
about the extensive legislative guidance in the statute,57 about its
policy goals,58 the rationale for delegation to the President and
specifically to the Commission to effectuate these goals,59 the
vitality of the procedures embodied in the statute to guide the
Commission’s discretion,60 and, ultimately, its acceptance of the
bargain struck by Congress to delegate significant regulatory
authority to an administrative agency. Hampton reveals most
clearly the Court’s judgment that the gravamen of the issue in these
matters of regulatory choice of instruments and strategy is
pragmatic and tethered to a vision of Congress as the play-caller or
the composer—rather than, to mix up the metaphors a bit more, the
quarterback or the orchestra conductor.61
So far as constitutional delegation is concerned, the Court’s
approach was rather formalistic and even somewhat circular.
56. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 410.
57. Id. at 404–05.
58. Id. at 413 (“Congress declares that one of its motives in fixing the rates of duty is
so to fix them that they shall encourage the industries of this country in the competition with
producers in other countries in the sale of goods in this country . . . .”).
59. Id. at 409 (“If it is thought wise to vary the customs duties according to changing
conditions of production at home and abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry
out this purpose . . . .”).
60. Id. at 405 (“The Tariff Commission does not itself fix duties, but, before the
President reaches a conclusion on the subject of investigation, the Tariff Commission must
make an investigation, and in doing so must give notice to all parties interested and an
opportunity to adduce evidence and to be heard.”).
61. See Chester F. Krizek, Administrative Law—Delegation of Powers—Constitutional
Law, 13 MARQ. L. REV. 56 (1928).
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That is, the matter of proper legislative delegation was considered
through the lens of a constitutional ipse dixit: Did Congress
delegate legislative power or simply authorize the executive branch
to implement public policy through the use of Article I executive
power? If the latter, the delegation was appropriate—and,
moreover, the executive maintained significant power to supervise
these executive officers. If the former, the delegation would be
unconstitutional, as it would represent the surrendering of its core
functions to a non-legislative entity.
What remained critically uncertain, however, is how much
guidance must Congress give to those entities who were exercising
regulatory power under the rubric of the statute.62 The formalism
of the Court’s “core functions” analysis obviated the need to
consider this question carefully. And it would fall to the New Deal
Court in the blockbuster trio of NIRA cases to resolve this
question—a question necessary to answer in order for Congress to
know how much flexibility it had in choosing the methods of
regulatory structure and strategy.
2. Administrative agency decision-making
The relationship between courts and agencies in the years
before the New Deal was, as legal historian Reuel Schiller notes, a
“hodge-podge of different statutes and common law doctrines that
could be used to challenge administrative actions.”63 In the main,
administrative agency decision-making was cabined in important
ways and what we have come to know as broad administrative
discretion in agency fact-finding, to say nothing of rulemaking, was
hardly known.64 This was principally the result of the federal
courts’ rather strict demarcation of the line between what functions
were properly for the federal courts and which functions could be
delegated to agencies to adjudicate.
62. Adrian Vermeule gives a cogent summary of the dilemma arising out of the
Court’s effort to synthesize the delegation view in Field, Grimaud, and Hampton. “[T]he whole
problem of delegation,” he writes, “is to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis.”
VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 52. That is to say, how to ensure that the delegate acts “within
the bounds of the statutory authorization” when that authorization is exceptionally broad or
vague. Id. As Vermeule notes, in an understatement, “the dilemma continues.” Id.
63. Schiller, supra note 1, at 407.
64. “In the early decades of the modern administrative state, agencies typically
proceeded not through rulemaking but through case-by-case adjudication . . . .” Sunstein &
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1933.
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The Supreme Court’s restrictions on agency rate-making
authority, delineated just before the turn of the century in Smyth v.
Ames,65 was one key mechanism of limiting administrative power.
At issue in this case was whether state rate-making regulation of
intra-state railroad shipments could set rates at confiscatory levels,
forcing railroads to raise long-haul rates to remain in business.
States therefore had incentives to set confiscatory prices, forcing
railroads to raise prices elsewhere in the system. Of course, if every
state did that, the regulatory environment would be mess. Smyth v.
Ames held that
a railroad company is entitled to exact such charges for
transportation as will enable it, at all times, not only to pay
operating expenses, but also to meet the interest regularly
accruing upon all its outstanding obligations, and justify a
dividend upon all its stock; and that to prohibit it from
maintaining rates or charges for transportation adequate to all
those ends will deprive it of its property without due process of
law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws.66

Further, “the company is entitled to ask . . . a fair return upon the
value of that which it employs for the public convenience.”67
The Court imposed additional restrictions in several other
cases. For example, the Court’s insistence in its 1920 decision in
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough68 that, before any
valuation decision was made in a rate-making proceeding, “the
State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a
judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent
judgment as to both law and facts.”69
Through these doctrines, the Court maintained a strong grip on
administrative agency power. Agency discretion would exist under
the rubric of judicial oversight and, as noted in the earlier
delegation cases, only as an outgrowth of executive power under a
formalistic reading of Article I.
This crabbed role of administrative agency function and
discretion became the bête noire of New Deal–era legal scholars

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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who championed a more robust role for the bureaucracy. In his
magnum opus, The Administrative Process, James Landis noted the
flawed syllogism at the heart of the court-centric view of regulatory
administration.70 “The insistence,” Landis writes, “that the
administrative process . . . must be subject to judicial review is to be
explained in part, I believe, by economic determinism. But the
deeper answer lies in our traditional notions of ‘law’ as being rules
administered and developed by courts.”71 Landis wrote in the
midst of the New Deal reorientation of the relationship between
agencies and courts; yet his focus included, especially, pre–New
Deal cases in which (generally in the rate-making context) the
courts rejected administrative agency fact-finding where such facts
would determine the outcome in disputes, requiring de novo
judicial review to ensure that the final legal decisions would accord
with the rule of law as guaranteed by the courts qua courts. Landis
saw, quite correctly, the success of New Deal administrative
constitutionalism as requiring more discretion for agencies and
thereby a more limited role for courts.72
The connecting logic from legislative delegation to agency
discretion in regard to fact-finding was the unsatisfactory and
unstable distinction between questions of fact and questions of law.
That is, the severe restrictions on agency decision-making were a
reflection of a worldview in which agency actions were interstitial
and in which the principal loci of power in the federal government
was Congress in policymaking and courts in adjudication. New
Deal progressives knew that the bright line was an unworkable one,
however. For example, Landis notes J.L. Dickinson’s formulation in
his 1927 treatise on administrative justice, quoting the long passage
that begins with “[i]n truth the distinction between ‘questions of
law’ and ‘questions of fact’ really gives little help in determining
how far the courts will review; and for the good reason that there
is no fixed distinction.”73 From this instability, Landis insists that
agency discretion in adjudicatory decision-making must be
70. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
71. Id. at 134–35. See the discussion in HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 222–25.
72. And also, independence from the President is a key—as Adrian Vermeule
describes it, the key—element of Landis’s argument for emboldened agency governance.
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 2467–70.
73. LANDIS, supra note 70, at 145 (quoting JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1927)).
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broadened and, to the doctrinal point, must be unmoored from the
narrow and formalistic approach characteristic of pre–New Deal
administrative law.74
The largely forgotten tussle over pre–New Deal agency
adjudication reveals well the tensions that greeted New Deal
reformers, in Congress and in the White House, as they grappled
with solutions to growing problems of market integration, state
capacity, and, of course, the Great Depression. Without a more
robust scheme of agency adjudicatory authority, conflicts over the
implementation of regulatory statutes would fall into the laps of
courts, ill-suited by procedure (and perhaps also by temperament,
given the times?) and limited by the impact they could hope to have
through case-by-case dispute resolution. Greater use of rulemaking
was the natural answer, to be sure; however, the legal foundation
of the rulemaking revolution would await evolution in
administrative structure, the enactment of the APA, and the
constructive support of the federal courts in fashioning
administrative law which facilitated this novel device for
regulatory administration. In the first third of the twentieth
century, the matter of agency authority through adjudication was
critical and persistently complicated by old doctrines and
separation of powers squeamishness. It would take bold actions by
the Supreme Court, and a studied attention by a purposive
Congress, to generate meaningful reform in the direction of more
capacious administrative power.

74. Landis was not alone in this sentiment. Professor White describes Frankfurter’s
sense of the issues at stake in the controversial growth of regulatory administration and
agency power. Like Landis, he saw these issues grounded in emergent views of separation
of powers. Indeed, as White writes, “[The] reframing of essentialist separation of powers
jurisprudence was crucial, Frankfurter believed, to the development of administrative law.”
WHITE, supra note 1, at 106. Legal historian William J. Novak highlights the career of Frank
J. Goodnow and his work on administration, work which “laid the groundwork for the
jurisprudential transition from nineteenth-century conceptions of the powers and duties of
office-holders to modern administrative law.” William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the
Modern Administrative State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249, 271 (Austin Sarat,
Bryant Garth & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002) (referring to FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1911)). See also HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 224–25 (describing the
influence of Goodnow on pre–New Deal administrative law).

168

3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

169

2/9/2021 9:08 PM

Engineering the Modern Administrative State

B. Unanswered Questions in the pre–New Deal Period
As the regulatory bureaucracy came up to the New Deal,
important new economic circumstances emerged. Congress faced a
formidable challenge in creating mechanisms to address the new
circumstances through administrative delegation. To fit under the
commerce power of the Constitution’s Article I, Congress needed
to convince the Court that the regulation of certain activities within
a state would ensure the protection of commerce’s stream. There
was, to be sure, support in the Court for this rationale, but the
burden fell nonetheless on Congress to make the connection
between its regulatory choices and the constitutional requisites.
Further, the delegation issue under the Constitution looked fairly
surmountable, as the Court had approved broad delegations,
subject only to the condition that Congress not attempt to delegate
its core lawmaking functions, thus going beyond what the
Constitution’s separation of powers requires. Yet, the Court had yet
to face the circumstance of a delegation so broad that the
fundamental policy choices were made by government officials
outside of the four corners of Congress. At bottom, the Court had
still not squarely addressed the question of what standards and
guidelines in the statute were absolutely necessary to ensure that
the agency to which Congress had delegated broad regulatory
authority was acting within the scope of the Constitution. So, as
Congress would learn painfully, this question of precisely what ex
ante statutory guardrails are required was not yet answered as the
Seventy-Third Congress embarked on its bold New Deal tasks.
Finally, the answer to the question of when and in what
circumstances agencies could, in adjudication, find facts and reach
determinations under the rubric of legislatively delegated authority
was surprisingly elusive by 1932. The Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and other
Progressive Era agencies enjoyed broad adjudicatory powers,
including the power to set just and reasonable rates and to find that
companies had engaged in unfair trade practices.75 However, these
decisions were ubiquitously reviewable by federal courts and, as
75. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, § 1(24), repealed by ICC
Termination Act of 1995, 5 Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 837 (“For the transportation of
persons or property in carrying out the orders and directions of the President, just and
reasonable rates shall be fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission[.]”).
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one case after another made clear, through de novo review. While
such judicial oversight did not suffice to eradicate the worry of
influential commentators, including Roscoe Pound76 and, in an
earlier era, the great Oxford don, Albert Venn Dicey, writing in the
1880s, that the bureaucracy would run amok,77 administrative
discretion was steadily becoming hard-wired into our governance
firmament. The looming question, which would be addressed
meaningfully in lodestar cases during the 1930s and 40s, was
how to balance the need for ever greater discretion with the
Constitution’s demands for separation of powers and the rule
of law.
One final note before turning next to the New Deal: We should
be wary of just embracing the simple observation that the Court’s
reticence during the pre–New Deal period to put its rubber stamp
on legislative delegation to agencies and to the expansion of
administrative governance was the product of deep conservative
impulse and agenda. True, judges and justices appointed by a long
series of Republican presidents dominated the federal courts. And
it is further true that prominent voices opposed the expanding
bureaucracy. However, we should not overlook the fact that the
acquiescence to, if not the exact endorsement of, national regulatory
power is found in many instances in the legal doctrine of the period.
Indeed, the federal courts had crossed a major bridge in declining
to rule unconstitutional major instances of social and economic
regulation, including the Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act,78 the
Federal Trade Act,79 the Railway Labor Act,80 and others. Without
doubt, the major expansion of the federal government’s
constitutional authority to regulate the economy would await the
76. On Dean Pound’s perspectives on the administrative state, see the comprehensive
discussion in ERNST, supra note 1, at 107–38. See also HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 218–19.
77. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(8th ed. 1915) (describing the tension between administrative agency decision-making and
rule-of-law values).
78. See Theodore W. Ruger, Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act (1938),
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economicsbusiness-and-labor/businesses-and-occupations/drug-and-cosmetic (last visited Oct. 12,
2020) (“Throughout its long history the FDCA has been relatively secure from serious
constitutional challenge, primarily because the statute regulates only products that
are ‘in interstate commerce’ and thus comfortably within Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority.”).
79. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
80. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
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canonical cases of the New Deal era, some of which we will discuss
in the next Part. But we should not exaggerate, with the hyperbole
often accorded to the “four Horsemen” of the pre–New Deal Court,
the conservatism of the Court’s approach to the bureaucracy in the
period leading up to the New Deal. The evidence suggests that the
story is considerably more complex and not reducible to a purely
internalist or externalist explanation.
Nor should we neglect the fact, as we will discuss further in the
remainder of this Article, that the judiciary has institutional
interests that go beyond merely instantiating ideological
preferences. Much of the Court’s reticence to go all in on
bureaucratic discretion, including before, during, and after the
New Deal, stems from the reluctance to abdicate power. This
reluctance is independent of ideological commitments, and we see
it manifest in relevant forms and fashions in the Court’s decisions
involving regulatory agencies. Landis and Frankfurter well
understood this and, more than others, saw the struggle as going
beyond a left/right divide. They saw it as a conflict between two
critical, and stubborn, institutions, each configured to check one
another, and, in that, each invested in maintaining significant,
durable institutional power. Indeed, the thesis of this Article is that
both Congress and the courts worked deliberately and strategically,
and ever conscious of the actions and motivations of one another,
toward a political accommodation, one which would ensure that
the modern administrative state would function meaningfully and
efficaciously in order to address various new wicked problems,
while also ensuring court supervision of agencies’ respect for
citizen rights.
II. ACCOMMODATING THE EMERGING ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
THE NEW DEAL SYNTHESIS
“[T]he arc results from the law working itself pure. It is not
that the law was overcome by external force. . . . The
unfolding logic of deference in administrative state law
represents, not a triumph of state force over reason, but a
flowering of reason.”81

81. VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 24.
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The conventional view sees the New Deal relationship between
elected officials and the Supreme Court as a zero-sum game: the
central question was, would the Supreme Court acquiesce or fight
the New Deal? This approach divides the period into two parts:
First, the Court slams Congress and the President by invalidating
key pieces of the New Deal agenda. These bold judicial decisions
put the new administrative state in peril.82 Less than two years later,
with overwhelming support of the people manifest in the elections
of 1936, an emboldened President Roosevelt threatened to pack the
Court. The Court, in response, retreated from its approach and
proceeded in one case after another to uphold New Deal legislation
against constitutional challenge.83 With this retreat, the essence of
modern regulatory administration is ensured, and, per the zerosum assumption underlying this view, the war is won. In a similar
vein, commentators see the Court’s embrace of agency adjudicatory
power in Crowell as a decisive victory for administrative power.84 It
vindicates Landis’s view that agency decision-making must be
freed from the shackles of pre-modern constitutionalism and of
presidential politics.85 New Deal decisions by the Hughes Court are
key to both of these explanations; and, although the mechanisms
are fundamentally distinct, they are key as well to the more
internalist explanations.
The reality, we suggest, is a good deal more complicated. A
thorough explanation requires more nuance than that provided by
either of these black-and-white, zero-sum views. The externalist
view is woefully undertheorized, lacking an explicit theory of

82. As Professor Bruce Ackerman views the matter, these decisions were the dying
gasps of the “Old Court,” and its “continued war on the liberal welfare state.” ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at 337–38. Even among the externalists, this is an extreme view, one eliding the
more complicated picture of commerce clause jurisprudence in the period between 1887 and
1935. As Kalman wryly observes, Ackerman, in this rendering “has proven even more
externalist than the externalists.” Kalman, supra note 1, at 2170.
83. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1.
84. But one which, on the face of the opinion, seemed to equivocate profoundly on the
matter of administrative discretion, given the integral role it accorded to the judiciary in
reviewing de novo jurisprudential and constitutional facts. Two prominent commentators at
the time, both of which would do so much to advance the agenda of administrative
constitutionalism, expressed grave concerns about Crowell at the time it was decided. As
Schiller notes, “Crowell v. Benson became something of a bete noire [sic] for the proponents of
prescriptive government.” Schiller, supra note 1, at 411–12 (summarizing the views of
Dickinson and Frankfurter).
85. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 2466–70.
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legislative-judicial relations,86 and, moreover, cannot explain the
contours of the judicial doctrine in the relevant cases.87 And purely
internalist explanations are wanting here, as elsewhere, in that they
more or less ignore politics. How else are we to interpret the judicial
skepticism first and the accommodation next? And how should we
see the Court’s developing administrative law in pre-APA cases in
light of the conditions of emergent administrative government and
of political strategy? These questions cannot be answered by either
of the rigid internalist and externalist views.
That said, our claim is ultimately limited. We cannot reject
whole cloth the assessment by generations of legal and political
historians that the Court’s move to the Left in this space was
influenced by decisions made and threatened by President
Roosevelt; nor do we reject the revisionist view associated with the
important new scholarship of Barry Cushman, Richard Friedman,
and Daniel Ernst that the Court was fashioning their approach
86. Although, to be fair, Barry Friedman’s extensive elaboration of the Court’s
jurisprudence in an articulated theory of judicial fidelity to politics is theoretically
sophisticated, if incomplete. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2009). See generally Friedman, Countermajoritarian, supra note 12 (describing
the flaws in the “externalist” account). Its incompleteness, which hopefully will become more
clear as we discuss the Court-Congress dialogue in Section II.B, infra, is that it does not
explain how the Court impacts congressional choices through strategic use of doctrine. While
not here claiming that the PPT account is the only plausible theoretical model for explaining
this dynamic relationship, it does highlight the importance of drawing a positive theoretical
connection between what Congress and the Supreme Court have done and why they have
done so. The political science literature on the relationship between law and politics, perhaps
beginning with Corwin, has struggled with this challenge. See McNollgast, The PoliticalEconomy of Law, in LAW & ECONOMICS HANDBOOK VOL. 2, at 1651 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and
the Role of Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY 273 (B. Weingast & D.
Wittman eds., 2006); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994). And while this article is not the place to adumbrate the
full value of a PPT account of the judicial-legislative dialogue, we feel confident in saying
that a full picture of the mechanisms of legal change and adaptation requires attention
to theory.
87. The most important empirical study of the “switch in time,” using sophisticated
analytical methods, is by Daniel E. Ho and Kevin M. Quinn. Ho & Quinn, supra note 12.
They conclude that Justice Roberts switched his vote, in that he moved suddenly leftward
during the October 1936 Term. While congruent with the “externalist” thesis, this dense
empirical paper does not express any sympathy (or lack of sympathy, for that matter) for the
underlying political influence story. That is to say, accepting the fact of Roberts’s change in
voting behavior is equally consistent with a view that indicates external influence as with
the view that he was suddenly persuaded by arguments in this Term’s cases. We discuss the
implications of Ho & Quinn for our analysis below. See infra note 177.
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around emerging doctrinal categories and considerations. Rather,
our aim is to contextualize the two central elements of
administrative law jurisprudence of this era—delegation, and the
adjudicatory authority of agencies—around a perspective that sees
both Congress and the judiciary as focused on implementing their
own objectives through strategic choices and under conditions
of constraint.
As we show, the interaction of the courts and elected officials in
the New Deal was not zero sum, but positive sum: both sides had
something to gain. And part of the acquiescence of the Supreme
Court reflected the New Dealers’ acceptance of the Court’s
conception of the requirements of due process, thereby maintaining
the integrity of the judicial system and allowing the courts to police
the government’s regulatory system.
A. Legislative Ambitions and Strategies in the First New Deal
The New Deal began with a flourish as the newly-elected
Franklin D. Roosevelt announced in his inaugural address that he
was “prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the
measures that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may
require.”88 He went on to say that “[t]hese measures, or such other
measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and
wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring
to speedy adoption.”89
President Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress soon
recognized that they needed to rely on the administrative state to
help rescue the nation from the Great Depression.90
The focus on the administrative state was borne of a steadily
increasing confidence on the part of progressive scholars and
public intellectuals that regulatory administration through a more
imaginative use of the bureaucracy and bureaucratic power was
88. Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt
(Mar. 4, 1933).
89. Id.
90. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME (2013); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945 (1999); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL
LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1995); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, ANXIOUS DECADES:
AMERICA IN PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION, 1920–1941 (1992); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: 1935–1936 (1960).

174

3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

175

2/9/2021 9:08 PM

Engineering the Modern Administrative State

important, and perhaps even essential, to the successful
implementation of public policy.91
The overwhelming vote of the American people for the
Democratic Party in the 1932 election reflected a faith in the
President and in Congress to establish instruments of governance
appropriate to the conditions of economic and social life.92 These
instruments emerged not only from political expediency, but also
from a growing enthusiasm for the bureaucratic state and the utility
of administrative agencies to implement legislative objectives and
thereby steward the political near-consensus for an activist national
government.93 Early in the development of New Deal regulatory
strategy, a number of key regulatory agencies emerged as the
template of legislative delegation and administrative expertise,
including the National Labor Relations Board,94 the Securities &
Exchange Commission,95 and the Federal Communications
Commission.96 The essence of New Deal regulatory administration
can be found in these three cornerstone agencies, and in the
91. Morton Horwitz summarizes the shift in focus and in strategy among liberal
reformers: “As the Progressive disenchantment with the competence of courts to perform
social engineering tasks combined with a loss of faith in the sensitivity of judges to questions
of social justice, the effort to replace courts with administrative experts became more
pronounced.” HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 225.
92. On the significance of Roosevelt’s election of 1932 to the expansion of the
administrative state, see Metzger, supra note 2, at 52 (“FDR’s election and enactment of the
broad regulatory statutes of the New Deal thus was not a sudden move to administrative
government, but it did represent a significant intensification.”). See also Novak, supra note 74.
93. This faith had its origins to some degree in the experimentations and insights of
the Progressive Era, where Congress and the President worked in tandem to establish a more
coherent conception of expertise and governance through administrative mechanisms. We
agree with Adrian Vermeule that the juxtaposition famously drawn between the so-called
classical Constitution and the new regulatory state is naïve. “The classical Constitution of
separated powers,” writes Vermeule, “cooperating in joint lawmaking across all three
branches, itself gave rise to the administrative state.” VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 46
(emphasis omitted).The seeds for twentieth century regulatory administration were indeed
planted by our constitutional scheme of government. Still and all, the New Deal period is
notable for its statutory innovations, and for its more fulsome grappling with the
implications of expanding bureaucracies for the rule of law and the decision-making
responsibilities and authorities of Congress and the President. It is through the New Deal
and key judicial decisions that these issues began to be more systematically worked out.
94. See JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD:
A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 1933–1937 (1974).
95. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003).
96. See PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32589, THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE CHANGING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE 1 (2018).
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regulatory apparatus they spawned. However, this strategic
template did not come into the picture until a major legal snag was
revealed and handled ultimately by the interaction of the Supreme
Court with elected officials, negotiating a solution to the problem
of the delegation of regulatory authority to bureaucratic agencies.
The snag emerged with the implementation of the National
Recovery Administration (NRA) and the regulatory structure
developed in the legislative centerpiece of FDR’s first hundred
days, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).97
When we look back at the controversy involving the NIRA, we
need to understand the contours of presidential, congressional, and
judicial interests and strategies. So far as President Roosevelt was
concerned, we could plausibly view the NIRA as just a bold version
of what presidents from Woodrow Wilson to the present had
viewed as a strong executive implementing a Progressive vision of
legislation and regulation. Before Landis’s magnum opus on the
administrative state in 1938,98 influential Progressives, such as Felix
Frankfurter, had already been explicating a muscular version of
regulatory administration, molded by ambitious presidents and
free from political turbulence.99 Likewise, Congress was steadily
expanding the scope of regulation through blockbuster statutes
going back two decades before the New Deal.100 Congress was
a willing and critical ally in presidential tactics of expanding the
national regulatory footprint. Indeed, Congress was anxious
to craft novel regulatory strategies, as evidenced by its important
efforts in the years just preceding the New Deal, including the
statute that was the subject of the Court’s Crowell decision,
the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
(LHWCA).101 And it worked quickly in the first Hundred Days
of the Roosevelt administration, a period labelled the “First
New Deal.”102

97. See infra text accompanying notes 114–21 (describing NIRA).
98. See LANDIS, supra note 70.
99. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930); Tushnet, supra
note 1, at 1568–76.
100. See supra Part I.
101. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–50 (1927).
102. See KENNEDY, supra note 90, at 363–80.
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B. Courts, Congress, and the Dialogue
What does the judiciary care about with regard to these
evolving regulatory strategies? And how do they manifest their
interests in their decisions? This question is critical for
understanding the Supreme Court’s actions in this period of study.
Yet it gets remarkably little attention. Recalling the dichotomy in
the traditional literature, either the courts are viewed as mere
reactors to political influence—essentially following the election
returns, as Mr. Dooley quipped—or they are viewed as
autonomous oracles, developing and applying doctrine.103
The Court implemented meaningful legal strategies in its
consideration of these novel regulatory mechanisms enacted via
statute or administrative order. And it is important to look, first, at
what the Court does and says; and, next, at why the justices decide
the way they do. Broadly speaking, we see the Supreme Court as
engaging in a dialogue with the legislature. In this dialogue, as
viewed through the lens of PPT, neither branch truly has the last
word.104 The dialogue is iterative and strategic and can be viewed,
at least in a stylized sense, as a game involving two purposive
actors, designing and implementing strategies in a system
structured by certain rules and practices.105
The judiciary’s strategies, as we will see as we consider these
cases in more detail in the next section, reflected important
concerns at two levels: First, they evidenced caution in exercises of
congressional and presidential power, especially bold new
initiatives. And, second, the Court was skeptical about the exercise
of administrative power by agencies, and it therefore created an
103. In this latter, internalist account, we could see the Justices as acting as faithful
agents to the rule of law, and doing best to implement legal principles or we could see the
Justices as acting in accordance with their own ideologies, and using their opinions as a fig
leaf to mask their true motives. This debate between the so-called attitudinalist model of
judicial behavior and what has been called the legal model continues to rage. See generally
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002). We say nothing here by way of interrogating these two models; whether or
not it is one or the other is not critical to the internalist explanation, at least as we consider it
here. That said, Cushman and others pushing internalist explanations seem to accept that
judges are acting as faithful agents, within the scope of rule of law constraints.
104. See DeFiguerido et al., supra note 42; see also Brian A. Marks, A Model of Judicial
Influence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
843 (2012).
105. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE
POLITICAL THEORY (1973) (describing game theoretic account of Court-Congress relations).
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approach that could be, and indeed was, viewed as intrusive
and formalistic.
Viewed through this lens, we might see, as the conventional
wisdom of the “switch in time” emphasizes, the Supreme Court as
distrusting of administrative agency power and just standing at the
ready to strike down the efforts of a collaboratively leftist president
and Congress to expand regulatory power. Yet this simplistic
confrontation view, originating with FDR for his own political
purposes, does not jibe with the evidence. Rather, the Court was
reasonably deferential to administrative agency power in the years
leading up to the New Deal. As White notes, “on the whole, the
Supreme Court had been relatively receptive to federal agencies in
the years between the [1906] Hepburn Act and the early 1930s.”106
The situation with respect to administrative agency adjudication
was, to be sure, more complicated. But the notion that the Supreme
Court acted decisively in the period preceding Crowell and after the
Second New Deal to rubber stamp agency decision-making is
seriously misleading.
The better assessment is that the dialogue between Congress,
the Court, and administrative agencies continued apace in the years
during and after the New Deal. No case was the last word, neither
the lodestar cases upholding legislative delegations nor the cases
deferring to administrative orders in adjudication. Rather,
Congress took account of judicial directions about how best to
create acceptable statutes; and courts maintained institutional
power. As to the latter, it is important to see the judiciary as an
institution with interests and objectives. Courts act with strategic
purpose as do legislators, the President, and agencies.
Moreover, the Court saw agency decision-making, particularly
within the realm of adjudication (noting that rulemaking on a broad
scale was still a fairly rare phenomenon at the time of the New
Deal), as potentially in tension with the work of the judiciary and,
perhaps even more critically, in a manner that looked rather alien
to judges. “Judges,” notes Daniel Ernst, “readily assumed that
norms of due process that had been worked out in the courts ought

106. WHITE, supra note 1, at 108.
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also to govern the ‘quasi-adjudication’ of administrative agencies,
and they condemned administrators who violated these norms.”107
That the Supreme Court cared deeply about these issues was
manifest in how it reviewed cases involving agency adjudication,
as we will explore more fully in Section D of this Part. And it is of
a piece with what we observe with respect to judicial decisionmaking in a large swath of cases involving regulatory
administration, including the prominent cases involving
procedural due process in the 1970s and beyond108 and in the “hard
look” cases of a later period in administrative law. As a bridge to
our discussion of concrete judicial doctrine and strategy in the
remainder of the paper, we here pull back the lens to say some more
about the motivations and objectives of the Court in carrying its
review function.
First, judicial scrutiny of regulatory choices made by Congress
through statute is very limited. Once federal authority to regulate
under Article I is established, the courts have precious little basis to
evaluate the techniques Congress employs to ensure that the
bureaucracy will implement legislative objectives. Leaving aside
the critical issue of whether or not Congress or the agency has
violated the Constitution, the question of Congressional choice of
regulatory instruments is essentially one of separation of powers.
Has Congress intruded on a power reserved to another branch of
government? In the context of the New Deal regulatory strategies
of Congress, courts stood ready to protect the Constitution’s
separation of powers through its responsibility to interpret the
Constitution. So, one element of the Court-Congress dialogue—the
Court’s protection of the separation of powers—emerges directly
from our constitutional practice of judicial review.
Second, courts care about their own sphere of authority and
practice, and they look hard at whether and to what extent a
regulatory schema, in design or in practice, impinges on the rule of
law. This incentive cannot easily be captured in either an internalist
or externalist perspective. That is, the Court’s protection of the rule
of law is related to a sense of institutional responsibility to protect
107. ERNST, supra note 1, at 2. Ernst summarizes the compromise thusly:
“Administrators exercised great discretionary power but only if they treated individuals
fairly and kept within limits imposed by Congress and the Constitution.” Id. at 7.
108. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990).
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rule of law values, a view that perhaps predates the Constitution
but is certainly embedded in our conception of judicial power and
limited government. Moreover, it is part of a cogent, purposive
strategy of the Court to ensure that its critical role in governance is
protected. We should understand the Court’s objectives as
connected to rule of law fidelity in both of these senses and for both
reasons described here. Of course, a major unanswered question in
the first half of the twentieth century concerned how to extend the
rule of law to the administrative state.
Third, and finally, the Congress-Court dialogue is carried out
in an environment in which neither institution truly has the last
word. The Court can rule on the matter of a statute’s
constitutionality and, if it holds that the statute violates the
Constitution, Congress may take another bite at the policy apple by
enacting a statute that cures these constitutional defects. And this
effort is also subject to judicial scrutiny (to say nothing of judicial
statutory interpretation). As we will explore in considerable detail
below, Congress’s efforts as the first New Deal transitioned to the
second New Deal period (1935–1936) were designed to meet the
Court’s objections and therefore to overcome constitutional
obstacles to Congress’s regulatory program. In contrast to the view
of classic externalist scholars who see the New Deal decisions as
more or less a product of the Justices’ ideologies, we see these key
constitutional cases as part of an iterative dialogue, one involving
three willful, strategically savvy institutions each concerned with
not only the best interests of the nation but, as well, their own
institutional interests and agendas.
C. Commerce Power and Delegation: Congress in a Bind
Faced with the Democratic Congress and President prepared to
take bold steps to address the ills of the Great Depression, the
Supreme Court would have to consider in the first years of the New
Deal the question of whether congressional authority to regulate
commerce in this way and the particular delegations of power to
non-legislators was consistent with the Constitution.109 The claim
made by the opponents of the centerpiece New Deal legislation was
109. The best treatment of these constitutional conflicts roughly contemporaneous with
these events is found in Robert L. Stern’s The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933–1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).
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that this legislation lacked adequate standards of policy to guide
administrative discretion and therefore risked that agencies would
not adhere to the rule of law. It was out of this collision of strategies
and interests that the showdown involving the constitutionality of
the NIRA arises.
To understand the nature of this controversy, it is necessary to
revisit the architecture of the NIRA; and, to do that, we must recur
to the political landscape in which President Roosevelt and the
Democratic Congress faced in focusing on this landmark piece of
legislation. The ambition and novelty of the NIRA could hardly be
overstated. Historian Barry Karl describes the act as “the result of a
remarkable set of compromises” and views the legislative
accomplishment in rather grand terms:
As a piece of legislation, it was a blend of planning positions that
had been debated for two decades. As an administrative program,
it met the political demands of presidential management of the
economy and, more important, the traditional public-works
politics of Congress and the states. Its importance as a historical
event is that it was the first significant American attempt to meet
the critical needs of the industrialized world of the thirties. 110

At the same time, the process by which the NIRA was enacted
was truncated, to say the least. Ira Katznelson notes that the NIRA
“was almost entirely drafted, in detail, by the executive branch . . .
[and] [was] passed virtually unchanged from the texts the
president had sent to the Hill.”111 Drafters of the statute, certainly
under the pressure of FDR, were resistant to suggestions to be more
cautious and methodical,112 the result of which was a statute which
was “[h]urriedly drafted and incautiously implemented”113 with
“[p]oor attention to constitutional detail.”114
If the sole issue was whether and to what extent Congress had
the power under the Constitution to regulate commercial activity
through this statutory mechanism, one devoted to industrial
recovery, the harried nature of the process would not be fatal.
The question of commerce power, after all, is a binary one; that is,
110. BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945,
at 116 (1983).
111. KATZNELSON, supra note 90, at 123–24.
112. See PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 23–26 (1982).
113. ERNST, supra note 1, at 6.
114. CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 38.
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either Congress has the power to regulate commerce in this domain
or it does not. In none of the key Commerce Clause cases before the
New Deal did the Court’s decision turn squarely on the regulatory
technique Congress deployed to carry out its regulatory strategy.
And, indeed, sometimes Congress employed an agency (the ICC
most famously, and the Railway Labor Board later), and other times
it relied on the executive branch to implement its objectives (as in
antitrust). The fundamental question was one of legislative power,
not instrument design.
Yet, the principal result of the NIRA’s careless drafting was that
its structure and procedure was, to understate the matter,
underdeveloped, a result that would prove fatal in litigation. The
NIRA contained very few standards to guide administrative
decision-making. Nor was the NRA directed to follow
administrative procedures of any serious sort in implementing its
charge.115 The absence of suitable safeguards and procedures, and
also a requirement of evidence, represented a failure of drafting
and of sensible appreciation for politics and the need for a political
accommodation.116 Put another way, the federal government lacked
the state capacity to make this form of regulation work.
115. The problems with the NIRA went beyond poor drafting, but also included rather
weak lawyering on behalf of this novel statute. As Cushman notes, “the lawyers defending
the NIRA had virtually no strategy,” and there appeared to be no real appreciation for the
fact that this statute was enacted on a shaky constitutional basis. Id. For a valuable
perspective from a leading New Dealer insider, see THOMAS EMERSON, YOUNG LAWYER FOR
THE NEW DEAL: AN INSIDER’S MEMOIR OF THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 23–24 (1991). See generally
PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 23–24 (1982); RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL
UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 16 (1995). By contrast, opponents to this farreaching legislation were well organized and strategic. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 53–57
(describing the efforts of the Liberty League and other organizations to mobilize against the
New Deal); see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 65 (“[B]usiness and economic conservatives were
critical in developing the New Deal attack on the modern national administrative state.”).
116. These were problems as well with the Agricultural Adjustment Act. See generally
MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR 119
(2002) (“[T]he drafters [of the AAA] framed legislation that rested on vague constitutional
theories and imprecise legal foundations.”). On the juxtaposition between the AAA and the
NIRA, the former salvaged by congressional action, approved by the courts, and the latter
an abject failure, Skocpol and Finegold wrote:
Like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act
created an extraordinary opportunity to extend government intervention into the
economy. But, at the beginning of the Depression, no properly political learning
had been going on to lay the basis for the NRA. Such learning as was going on in
the 1920s about how to plan for industry was happening within particular
industries, with trade association leaders doing the learning. When the federal
government withdrew from even nominal control of industry after World War I,
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Moreover, the statute delegated extraordinary powers to
executive officials. Ira Katznelson summarizes the unique political
process that accompanied the New Deal statutes of the first
hundred days:
[T]hese measures were characterized by immense powers
delegated from the legislature to the executive branch that
dramatically expanded the powers of federal agencies, many of
which were new. . . . [T]he presidency . . . did gain extraordinary
discretion under very broad and often not very well-specified
emergency legislation.117

Ultimately, it was the combination of these problems that
proved problematic. The powers delegated were broad, and
arguably “legislative” in nature; as scholars would later summarize
the nondelegation doctrine, focusing on pre–New Deal cases as
well as the NIRA cases, Congress was seen as having delegated its
“core functions” to government officials outside of Congress. And,
to make matters worse, there were neither any “intelligible
principles” to guide administrative decision-making nor any
procedures to give us confidence that these officials would exercise
power responsibly.
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
NIRA first in Panama Refining v. Ryan.118 At issue here was the
President’s power to approve and enforce codes of fair competition
under Section 9(c) of the Act.119 Panama Refining challenged a code
it left the field clear to the giant corporations and to the trade associations, whose
efforts Hoover simply encouraged and attempted to coordinate, instead of
building up independent governmental apparatuses. Thus, when the Depression
struck and the New Deal found itself committed to the sponsorship of industrial
planning, there was only the “analogue of war” to draw on—an invocation of the
emergency mobilization practices used during World War I.
Government’s job in depression was much more difficult than in war: not just
exhorting maximum production from industry but stimulating recovery and
allocating burdens in a time of scarcity.
KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW DEAL 64 (1995).
117. KATZNELSON, supra note 90, at 124.
118. Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
119. As the relevant provision of the Act stated:
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from
storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.
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applicable within the petroleum industry, one which was being
used here to enforce bans on the sale of “hot oil,” that is, petroleum
produced in excess of state quotas. The code did not require the
President to make findings of fact before prosecuting businesses for
violating its provisions. The Court struck down this provision on
the grounds that it was tantamount to “uncontrolled legislative
power” and thus represented an unconstitutional delegation under
the Constitution.120
Acknowledging that broad delegations to the President had
been upheld in a number of decisions going back to the previous
century, the Court viewed the delegation here as beyond the pale,
given the absence of clearly delineated standards for the President
to follow in implementing the statute and, as well, the absence of
procedures, such as findings of fact, that the President would have
to follow to carry out his regulatory responsibilities under Section
9(c).121 “The Congress,” writes Chief Justice Hughes for the Court,
“manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.
Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex
conditions involving a host of details with which the national
legislature cannot deal directly.”122
The heart of the Court’s analysis came where it sought to
balance its views about the unacceptable breadth of the delegation
of power and the need for deference to congressional choices
about administrative technique and expediency in regulation. The
Court says:
Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this
subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for
not to exceed six months, or both.
Id. at 406.
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id. at 430. The Court then draws its principal conclusion after this long litany of
cases upholding delegation within proscribed limits:
Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has
recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional
authority to transcend. We think that § 9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the
transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has
declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is
no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the
transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.
Id.
122. Id. at 421.
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The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the
Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality,
which will enable it to perform its function in laying down
policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the
policy as declared by the [L]egislature is to apply. Without
capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the
anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances
calling for its exertion would be but a futility. But the constant
recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and
the wide range of administrative authority which has been
developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional
system is to be maintained. 123

The second principal challenge to the NIRA came in 1935, in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,124 a challenge to New York
City’s Live Poultry Code, a code enacted under the rubric of the
NIRA. This case, unlike Panama Refining, represented a doublebarreled legal attack on the constitutionality of the statute, one
barrel concerning the scope of the legislative delegation and the
other concerning the scope of federal power under the Commerce
Clause. As the Court held, the constitutional flaws in the relevant
provisions of the Act stemmed from both sources. First, the NIRA
was a hard sell under extant Commerce Clause doctrine. The case
came up to the Court from a conviction of a local slaughterhouse
operator, the Schechter Corporation, which had slaughtered
poultry at its Brooklyn facility, then sold the poultry to local
retailers for direct sale to consumers. There was no evidence of this
chicken being sold in interstate commerce. This case was about as
poor a vehicle with which to test the constitutionality of the statute
as could be devised. A unanimous Court rejected the government’s
strained argument that the statute could be applied against
this defendant.125
Yet the fact that this constitutional challenge comes up in a case
where the constitutional case for federal legislation was weak, did

123. Id.
124. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
125. Id. at 499.
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not spell the doom for the NIRA, since presumably there were other
companies who did in fact engage in commerce across state lines.126
The dagger in the NIRA came from the Court’s unanimous
holding in Schechter Poultry that the NIRA represented an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.127
Here the absence of adequate standards and of intelligible
principles which would guide agency conduct proved fatal. “In
providing for codes,” the Court announces, “the [NIRA] dispenses
with this administrative procedure and with any administrative
procedure of an analogous character.”128 The Court contrasts this
statute with other regulatory statutes which had easily passed
scrutiny, including the Federal Trade Commission. By contrast to
these other statutes, Section 3 of NIRA “supplies no standards for
any trade, industry or activity.”129 It concludes that “[s]uch a
sweeping delegation of legislative power finds no support in the
decisions upon which the Government especially relies.”130 This
view was reinforced in Justice Cardozo’s remarkable concurring
opinion, one in which he describes Section 3 of the NIRA as
“delegation running riot.”131
In the end, the poor statutory drafting and insufficient attention
to constitutional principles as they had been considered in previous
instances of regulation came back to haunt Congress and the
President. The concerns that had been percolating among the
judiciary, and in particular Chief Justice Hughes, about limitless
administrative power overflowed in Schechter Poultry, as the Court
unanimously looked with scorn at this haphazard statute and saw
animate threats to the rule of law and the separation of powers.132
126. Nor did this holding disturb in any meaningful way the state of the Court’s
commerce clause jurisprudence. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES
EVAN HUGHES, 1930–1941, at 68 (2007); see also Cushman, supra note 11, at 1965 (“At the time,
such an interpretation was thoroughly conventional.”). Indeed, Stern suggests that the
commerce clause holding was unnecessary. Stern, supra note 109, at 662.
127. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 542.
128. Id. at 533.
129. Id. at 541.
130. Id. at 539.
131. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). As Professor White observes, “if there was any
doubt that the limits of a permissive Court stance toward congressional delegations had been
reached with the Panama Refining-Schechter sequence, it disappeared with Cardozo’s
concurrence in Schechter.” WHITE, supra note 1, at 111.
132. Professor Ernst tells the story of Justice Brandeis calling two of Roosevelt’s main
lawyers, Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran, and proclaiming that “[t]he President has

186

3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

187

2/9/2021 9:08 PM

Engineering the Modern Administrative State

The statute, declared Hughes, provided the NIRA with a “wide
field of legislative possibilities” in which the agency could “roam
at will.”133 “Such a delegation of legislative power,” he wrote, “is
unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the
constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”134
The Court faced one more case growing out of constitutional
objections to the Democrats’ bold strategies with respect to the
National Industrial Recovery Act. Congress had enacted the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in 1935,135 effectively taking the
code for the industry written under NIRA and passing it as
legislation. Delegation to write the code was therefore not an issue.
The key issue confronting Congress was how to maintain decent
wages for miners in the coal industry and also to provide a right to
these miners to bargain collectively. In an important sense, this Act,
and the corresponding Coal Code that emerged from the NRA after
the statute’s enactment, was an incipient and unsuccessful bridge
between the pro-labor strategies in the NIRA and the major effort
to regulate labor relations in the Wagner Act, to be examined in
depth below. As Stern notes in his extended discussion of the
constitutional controversy, labor costs were more than 50 percent
of the total cost of coal mine production, and so the regulation of
wages was an important step in regulating commerce.136 But was
this enough to pass constitutional muster?137
The Court considered the constitutional challenge in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.138 The Court here, as in Schechter Poultry, evaluated
both objections to the Act: first, that this effort to regulate intrastate
activities—wages of workers—was beyond the scope of the
Commerce Clause and, second, that this statute represented an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Court’s tone
been living in a fool’s paradise,” and warned that the administration’s future actions would
have to be “considered most carefully in light of these decisions by a unanimous court.”
ERNST, supra note 1, at 60.
133. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 538.
134. Id. at 537.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 801 (otherwise known as the “Guffey-Snyder” Act).
136. Stern, supra note 109, at 664.
137. Stern notes: “President Roosevelt requested Congress to pass the bill, despite
admitted doubts as to whether the Supreme Court would uphold its constitutionality . . . .”
Id. at 667 (citing Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in 4 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 297–98 (1938)).
138. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278 (1936).
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was abidingly negative; it appeared to like nothing about this
statute. The Court equated mining with manufacturing and
stressed the local character of the activities regulated. And none of
the traditional exceptions to the otherwise prohibited device of
regulating intrastate activities on the argument that they affect the
channels and/or instrumentalities of commerce are applicable
here. The regulation, as in Schechter Poultry, deals with a “purely
local activity.”139
Also fatal is the delegation of lawmaking power, and in
particular, the delegation of power to private parties in the form of
a National Bituminous Coal Commission. “[T]his,” says the Court,
“is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be
and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business.”140 This kind of delegation “undertakes an intolerable
and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and
private property.”141
Conventional wisdom sees the flaws with the NIRA, as
revealed in the decided cases, as stemming from the dissonance
between legislative power and principles of legality. Public
intellectuals, scholars, and even some of the Justices speaking in
their extra-judicial capacities in the half century before the New
Deal, emphasized this theme.142 Yet, the idea that these
nondelegation doctrines follow more or less the line set out by
A.V. Dicey in his critique of administrative discretion143 is
overly simplistic.144

139. Id. at 304.
140. Id. at 311.
141. Id.
142. See ERNST, supra note 1, at 2 (“Americans’ belief that courts might deliver them
from Tocqueville’s nightmare gave a distinctly legalistic cast to the administrate state they
created after 1900.”); id. at 52 (noting Hughes speech in 1931 warning against
“unscrupulous” administrators).
143. See generally DICEY, supra note 77. On the legalist tradition of which Dicey,
Friedrich Hayek, and others sprung, see HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 225–30.
144. See LANDIS, supra note 70, at 50–51 (“A principle that runs through the many
decisions on delegation of power, however, is that the grant of the power to adjudicate must
be bound to a stated objective which the determination of claims must tend, and, further,
that the grant of the power to regulate must specify not only the subject matter of regulation
but also the end which regulation seeks to attain.”).
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A more nuanced way to understand the Court’s skepticism
about delegation to agencies is to see that Congress had created a
statute that did not provide the sort of standards which would
channel administrative discretion in a direction which would best
implement legislative objectives. Moreover, the statute gave the
judiciary a basis to evaluate the soundness of administrative
decision-making under relevant principles of statutory
interpretation and administrative law. Not surprisingly, the Court
emphasized the absence of administrative procedures, which could
limit the discretion of agencies appropriately.145
All was not lost, however, as the Court’s opinions, especially in
Schechter Poultry, were not abidingly negative as they are so
commonly painted. Indeed, the Court went so far as to provide a
template for Congress in solving these problems. It is critically
important that we see the Court in these delegation cases as raising
concerns that it was confident would be properly addressed and
solved by Congress.146 The Court in Panama Refining and Schechter
Poultry issued what is essentially a how-to manual—a template for
constitutional validity.147
What were the minimal terms of this how-to manual, this quid
pro quo? First, intelligible principles to guide administrative
agency discretion, as the Justices made clear in these cases; and
second, procedures which would ensure that agencies would keep
within their lanes and would implement the objectives of
the statute.

145. As an antidote to the view that the two lodestar cases represented a resuscitation
of formalist separation of powers orthodoxy, White points to “a passage toward the end of
the [Panama Refining] opinion that hinted that the simple attachment of a few procedural
safeguards to congressional delegations might assuage the Court’s constitutional concerns.”
WHITE, supra note 1, at 110 (citing Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935)).
146. Cushman points to an interesting comment from the diary of Harold Ickes,
Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior. He says that at a dinner party, Justice Owen Roberts,
who had voted with the majority in Panama Refining, assured him “that he is entirely
sympathetic with what we are trying to do in the oil matter and that he hoped we would
pass a statute that would enable us to carry out our policy.” Cushman, supra note 126, at 1936
(quoting HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES 273 (1953)).
147. As Cushman summarizes the impact of the 1935–36 cases, these decisions “did not
erect insuperable obstacles to reform in these areas, but instead channeled congressional
efforts into achieving those desired ends through means that were consistent with prevailing
constitutional doctrine.” Id. at 1964; see also Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Consultation, 79 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79, 80 (1998) (describing that “the Hughes
Court offered the Roosevelt administration a distinctive form of consultative relationship”).
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Likewise, these procedures are important to safeguard and
facilitate judicial interests. Courts can steer agencies toward sound
decision-making by requiring agencies to follow processes that are
fair and efficient; judicial-like procedures meet these criteria, and it
is no accident that courts embrace procedures that are familiar to
the courtroom. This is a quintessential example of the political and
legal accommodation so instrumental to the establishment and
maintenance of the modern administrative state. Congress gets
what it wants by establishing a schema of regulatory
administration that passes constitutional muster; courts give their
blessing to statutes delegating regulatory authority to an agency
when those statutes contain suitable procedural safeguards.148
D. Agency Adjudication and the Judicial Function
The critical role of the judicial function in the area of regulatory
administration was a central theme of the Court’s decision in
Crowell v. Benson.149 In Crowell, the Court considered whether an
administrator could make findings of fact in disputes arising under
the rubric of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act (LHWCA) and, further, whether these findings would be final.
Yes, answered the Court as to both questions, so long as the
findings were supported by evidence and within the scope of the
administrator’s authority. Consistent with the political
accommodation, Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court, “[t]o
hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the
legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are
peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an
administrative agency specially assigned to that task.”150
Equally consistent with the political accommodation, the Court
insisted that this authority was subject to the requirement that all
legal questions were to be determined by an Article III court
148. Commentators at the time understood that the Court was, as White puts it,
“providing blueprints for the creation of new agencies.” WHITE, supra note 1, at 113; see, e.g.,
Reuben Oppenheimer, The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41
(1937) (noting, with special reference to the nondelegation cases, that “the quasi-judicial or
quasi-legislative administrative tribunal has been recognized and approved as a permanent
instrument of government”).
149. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
150. Id. at 46.
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without any deference to administrators. Moreover, courts would
make de novo factual determinations in matters involving
jurisprudential and constitutional facts. They would do so because
of the essential role of the federal courts in supervising
administrative power. Further, agency decisions would be subject
to judicial review by an Article III court, a requirement that would
become well embedded in the structure of federal courts
jurisprudence in the years to follow—indeed, would become a
mainstay of the Hart-Wechsler synthesis as described by later
generations of federal courts scholars.151
Crowell reflected an accommodation of philosophies and of
interests. Tension about the expanding scope of administrative
power was conspicuous in the period leading up to the New
Deal,152 and even Hughes himself had expressed concern about the
bureaucracy.153 To be sure, Congress had enacted legislation, in
addition to the LHWCA, authorizing administrators to make
factual determinations—to put in rather more grandiose terms, to
exercise administrative discretion and therefore to bear the weight
of governmental power—and yet the Court had been tepid in
embracing this new reality of governance. In its Ben Avon ruling in
1920,154 the Court insisted that a federal court determine de novo
whether or not a rate was confiscatory.155 While vehemently
criticized by New Deal architects, including Frankfurter,156 Ben
Avon remained good law by the time the Court considered the
matter of administrative power twelve years later in Crowell.157 In
this light, Crowell was a resounding victory for the New Deal

151. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 939–40 (1988).
152. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1593 (“The proliferation of agencies in the New
Deal placed this accommodation under substantial pressure.”).
153. See ERNST, supra note 1, at 43–50, 52.
154. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 290 (1920). For a full
discussion of Ben Avon and its place in pre–New Deal struggles over the nature and scope of
the administrative state, see Schiller, supra note 1, at 401–04.
155. For a full discussion of Ben Avon and its place in pre–New Deal struggles over the
nature and scope of the administrative state, see Schiller, supra note 1, at 401–04.
156. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & J. FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 464 (2d ed. 1935).
157. This was much to the chagrin of New Dealers. See Schiller, supra note 1, at 403
(“For progressive proponents of the administrative state, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ben
Avon was a nightmare come to life.”).
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agency, seeking a balance between broad administrative discretion
and judicial authority.
Considered as a product of its critical time, Crowell reveals a
judicial accommodation of myriad interests, in particular, the
interests of Congress in creating a scheme of administrative
governance that was, as Hughes put it, “prompt, continuous, expert
and inexpensive,”158 and the interests of the courts in maintaining
an adequate judicial role. Beyond this, Crowell also acknowledges
that the key role of administrative procedure and the establishment
of proper guardrails to the exercise of bureaucratic power. These
procedures are an essential part of the quid pro quo for the Court’s
constitutional imprimatur on agency power. This would become
clearer in the run-up to the enactment of the APA and in a number
of blockbuster administrative law cases in the seven decades
afterward, but it is important to see Crowell through that lens.
Chief Justice Hughes notes that the statute provides for notice
and hearing, a hearing which is to be public, and, moreover,
requires the administrator’s decision to be based upon the “record
of the hearings and other proceedings” before him.159 These
procedures are characteristic of foundational regulatory statutes of
the Progressive Era, and the Court noted precedent that deals with
the responsibility of agency officials to base their decisions on
evidence in the record.160 Much is made in hindsight of the Court’s
requirement that there be judicial review of any legal
determinations,161 but this principle was shaky even as stated in the
case. Yet, as Adrian Vermeule notes in his extended discussion of
law’s abnegation in the decades following Hughes’s synthesis in
Crowell, the requirement of judicial review would be tenuous
without clarity about what approach courts were to take to
examining jurisprudential and constitutional facts and, likewise,
158. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).
159. Id. at 48 (quoting Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of
1927 § 23(b), 44 Stat. 1424 (1927)).
160. Id. (citing Chi. Junction Case v. United States, 264 U.S. 258, 263 (1924), United
States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288 (1924), and Interstate Com. Comm’n v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913)).
161. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power
of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 645 (2004); Fallon, supra note 151, at 916; David P.
Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931–1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 514
(1987); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee
Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 848–49 (1986).
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what deference courts would pay to administrative agency
determinations.162 The key takeaway from Crowell, however, is that
agencies must undertake their responsibilities consistent with
administrative procedures, procedures which generate better
decisions and which provide information that enables Congress
and the President to carry out their oversight responsibilities and
other strategic objectives.163 As we show below, these uncertainties
about proper scope of review, etc., would be settled as the evolving
political accommodation became much clearer between 1935 with
the passage of the NLRA and 1946 with the passage of the APA.
The Court had embraced administrative discretion in matters of
agency adjudication where there are suitable procedures to guide
such discretion and where the judiciary maintained a supervisory
role. This was the message of Crowell, a message that would be
reaffirmed later in the New Deal as the Court considered further
matters involving the performance of administrative functions in
the context of agency adjudication. This accommodation by the
Court to judicial interests in maintaining a wide swath of
supervisory power through de novo review and strictures on
agency decision-making even in fact finding, went down
skeptically with New Deal progressives. For Landis and
Frankfurter especially, they saw the Court’s decision as, at best, a
very small step forward in the establishing of meaningful
administrative discretion and, at worst, a betrayal of the ideals of
the administrative state.164

162. VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 29–31. Vermeule continues with an interesting
analysis of what he calls the “collapse” of Crowell, noting the ways in which it has been at
least thinned out, if not gutted, by a number of doctrinal developments in administrative
law. See id. at 29–36. There is a weaker and stronger version of Vermeule’s claim. The weaker
version is to see the courts after Crowell as moving away, if not entirely abandoning its
commitment to independent judicial review. The journey from Crowell to Chevron could be
viewed as the rejiggering of agency/court relations so as to deemphasize the de novo
character of judicial review in matters of factual findings and interpretation. A stronger
version is that the seeds of Crowell’s collapse is in Hughes’ opinion itself. It is difficult to assess
this stronger claim without an exegesis of post-Crowell administrative law doctrine, and such
an exegesis is beyond the scope of this article. Still and all, we would make a couple points
relevant to this discussion.
163. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
164. See LANDIS, supra note 70, at 134 (“The insistence that the administrative process
in these phases must be subject to judicial review is to be explained in part, I believe,
by economic determinism.”); see also Crowell, 285 U.S. at 94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
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E. Resolving the Delegation Dilemma in the Second New Deal
The Second New Deal represents Congress and the President’s
attempt to secure the victories won with regard to national
economic policy and power, and also to ensure that new regulatory
instruments would pass constitutional muster. Famously,
President Roosevelt railed against the Court and was resolved to
press ahead with his agenda by bold means, including the
appointment of justices sympathetic to the New Deal; he even
threatened to pack the Court with justices who would outnumber
those recalcitrant to his agenda. Just as the Republicans defended
the Court for its decisions invalidating key parts of the Democrats’
New Deal agenda,165 the Democratic Party made clear that it would
persist in enacting broad national legislation to carry out its policy
objectives. As Senator Barkley said in a speech quoting Lincoln’s
first inaugural:
[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions, affecting
the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation
between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased
to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned
their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. 166

Within a short three-year period, much of the dust would have
settled, and the Democrats’ policy agenda would be secured against
constitutional attack. The New Deal agency would triumph.
As we previewed our argument in the introduction, neither the
externalist nor internalist views adequately capture the story of the
Court’s decisions in this critical era, although both are important
factors in the equation. To us, a central difference between the

(“[S]ince the advantage of prolonged litigation lies with the party able to bear heavy
expenses, the purpose of the Act will be in part defeated.”).
165. The Republican Party platform said The New Deal “has insisted on the passage of
laws contrary to the Constitution” and “[t]he integrity and authority of the Supreme Court
has been flouted.” Republican Party Platform of 1936, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1936 (last visited
Oct. 30, 2020).
166. Lincoln continued (in a Lockean line): “Nor is there in this view any assault upon
the court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly
brought before them; and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to
political purposes.” President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861),
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/1inaug.htm.
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Court’s approach in the first wave of delegation cases during the
New Deal and the second wave, exemplified particularly by Jones
& Laughlin, is that Congress enacted a statute that met objections
and constitutional requirements, as articulated by the majority over
the objections of the four horsemen. Although most constitutional
law scholars seem not to have noticed, the majority opinion in
Panama Refining and especially Schechter Poultry gave Congress an
explicit and detailed roadmap for how to construct a scheme of
administrative process that would satisfy its demands. And it was
not a coincidence that these demands were particularly focused on
the fidelity of agencies to administrative procedures that met both
Congress’s and the judiciary’s strategic interests and needs.
1. Administrative politics and the origins of the NLRA
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), also
known as the Wagner Act,167 in 1935, in part to stem a rising tide of
industrial violence of the 1930s. The NLRA was the final step in a
series of efforts made in the wake of NIRA-inspired unrest to
improve and make permanent a set of institutions to foster the
peaceful resolution of labor disputes. The new bill drew on the
failures of the previous incarnations of the law.168
The NLRA succeeded where prior attempts had failed because
it went beyond earlier legislation in five ways: (1) It defined a
number of unfair labor practices that by nature interfered with the
meaningful enjoyment of the organizing and bargaining rights
created in the law, imposing clear and uncontestable constraints on
employers; (2) it provided a Board-controlled process for election
of union representatives, effectively constraining employees as
well; (3) it provided the NLRB with the power and independence
necessary for effective enforcement of those constraints upon both
workers and their employers; (4) it cleared up lines of authority so
the president could not intervene on an ad hoc basis; and the NLRB
did not depend, as did its predecessors, on other organizations for
enforcement; and (5) it created a regulatory process that the
Supreme Court held constitutional and hence legally binding on
employers. The last two accomplishments represent part of the

167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935).
168. See id.
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basis for the development of administrative law that transforms the
right of open access into a reality.
To summarize our argument: the NIRA asserted various labor
rights to organize, but failed to create an effective set of either
administrative structures or processes to enforce them:
• NIRA provided no clear mandate, command structure, or
process to create rules and precedents with which to regulate
union activity and labor-firm bargaining. For example, it failed
to define adequately the type of acceptable organizations
designed to represent union members and created no process
or substance by which a firm could be found not in compliance
with the law.
• Unclear lines of authority created bureaucratic and
administrative problems: The law required that the NLB rely
on the NRA and the Department of Justice for enforcement,
each of which had their own priorities that conflicted with
those of the NLRB.
• President Roosevelt intervened in ad hoc ways inconsistent
with the NRA.
• The constitutional status of the law and hence NLB regulations
remained uncertain, affording employers the ability to delay
and resist NLRB authority.

In the face of this confusion, the absence of clear
constitutionality, and the inability of the government to enforce the
rules, employers resisted labor regulation at every turn. As noted,
this disparity between promise and actuality in the context of the
Depression generated unprecedented labor unrest.
The NLRA resolved each of these problems. It granted the
NLRB a substantially clearer mandate and effective structure and
process. The Act clarified lines of authority. It also gave the Board
the direct ability to enforce its rulings without relying on other
organizations, including subpoena powers. By making the NLRB
the sole legal authority in its area, the Act also removed the ability
of the president to intervene within the agency’s jurisdiction. In
stark contrast to the 1933 legislation, the Act was consciously
designed to maximize the likelihood that the Supreme Court would
find it constitutional. Finally, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of
the NLRA’s constitutionality led to enforcement of the Act,
employer compliance, and an end to violence associated with labor.
196
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The NLRA was the culmination of several decades of legal
innovation—innovation that is largely responsible for
contemporary public law jurisprudence. Politics were an
undeniable component of the eventual finding of New Deal laws as
constitutional beginning in 1937. But the traditional account of the
New Deal constitutional controversies over-emphasizes politics
and under-emphasizes the role of the development of doctrine and
the necessary inventions in the technology of administrative
delegation. The standard wisdom is that after FDR threatened to
pack the court, Justice Roberts made his famous “switch in time,”
and the Justices acquiesced to his New Deal legislation. Although a
caricature, this brief summary of the standard wisdom in
constitutional law case books captures their essence.
We argue that a far more complex and interesting story hides
in legal doctrine. The NLRA was a clear and direct attempt to
respond to concerns about the New Deal’s constitutionality as
articulated by the Court in the early New Deal cases. By doing so,
Congress invented new structures and processes that the Court
would hold in Jones & Laughlin as satisfying constitutional
restrictions. We assert that Congress and the Court engaged in a
dialogue concerning issues of delegation, political control,
oversight, and the means of ensuring rights of due process. By
trying new structures and processes and having them, at times,
struck down and, at times, upheld, Congress and the Court jointly
created a major expansion of administrative law.
2. To the Supreme Court
The NLRA drafters’ attention to the New Deal precedent and
concerted effort to address the Court’s concerns paid off. In Jones &
Laughlin Steel v. NLRB,169 holding the Wagner Act constitutional,
the Court acknowledged that Congress had fixed the delegation
issue under the NIRA. After declaring that the Schechter Poultry case
is “not controlling here,” the Court goes on to find that,
The Act establishes standards to which the Board must conform.
There must be complaint, notice and hearing. The Board must
receive evidence and make findings. The findings as to the facts
are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence. The order
of the Board is subject to review by the designated court, and only
169. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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when sustained by the court may the order be enforced. Upon that
review all questions of the jurisdiction of the Board and the
regularity of its proceedings, all questions of constitutional right
or statutory authority, are open to examination by the court. We
construe the procedural provisions as affording adequate
opportunity to secure judicial protection against arbitrary action
in accordance with the well settled rules applicable to
administrative agencies set up by Congress to aid in the
enforcement of valid legislation.170

Furthermore, the Court declared that the Act properly defines
and delineates the scope of the Board’s authority:
We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may be
construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional
authority. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Board, and
invoked in this instance, is found in section 10(a) [29 U.S.C.A.
160(a)], which provides:
“Sec. 10(a). The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided,
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
(listed in section 8 [section 158]) affecting commerce.”
The critical words of this provision, prescribing the limits of the
Board’s authority in dealing with the labor practices, are “affecting
commerce.” The act specifically defines the “commerce” to which
it refers (section 2(6), 29 U.S.C.A. 152(6)) . . . .171

By contrast, the NIRA (1) delegated authority without sufficient
definition of terms or limits on authority; (2) delegated regulatory
authority to private groups; (3) paid little attention to legal
decisions about existing legislation with which the New Deal
legislation interacted; and (4) made few provisions to ensure
respect for rights of due process. Therefore, the Court ruled it
unconstitutional. However, the Wagner Act sought to remedy these
defects; it (1) delegated authority with sufficient definitions of
terms and limits on authority; (2) delegated authority to the
National Labor Relations Board, a government administrative
agency; (3) responded to concerns expressed by the Court in
previous New Deal cases and modeled the administrative schema
on an existing and established agency; and (4) ensured due process
rights through delineating the processes through which the agency
170. Id. at 41, 47.
171. Id. at 30–31.
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was to exercise its authority. It learned from the Court’s previous
decisions and when drafting the NLRA, Wagner and his writers
placed the new agency comfortably within constitutional bounds.
3. Jones and the interbranch dialogue
Why did the Court seemingly move in a much more
sympathetic direction toward the New Deal Congress’s agenda in
Jones & Laughlin? Barry Friedman sees this turn as a sharp one,
viewing the Court in Jones & Laughlin as “flat out overturn[ing] the
doctrines that it previously had used to strike down New Deal
legislation, abdicating virtually all responsibility to patrol
economic legislation for its consistency with the Constitution.”172
For G. Edward White, this reflects mainly a shift from separation of
powers to Commerce Clause concerns. But this still prompts the
question of why.173 In a somewhat similar vein, Barry Cushman
points out the different doctrinal issues that were at play in these
cases.174 Cushman argues that the early laws were hastily written,
often without justification; they were poorly crafted. Further, the
quality of the people involved was low.175 Both crafting and quality
were much higher, he argues, for the drafting of the acts associated
with the later New Deal cases, including the NLRA and the Social
Security Act.176
These suggestions point to externalist explanations for the
difference.177 A more compelling account is that Congress had
172. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 234.
173. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 111–13.
174. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 37.
175. See id.
176. “The drafters of the Wagner Act, by contrast, framed its provisions with both eyes
firmly fixed on contemporary constitutional doctrine.” Id. at 38. Cushman says the same
holds for the Social Security Act. Id.
177. Ho & Quinn, supra note 12, provide some of the most unique evidence about the
externalist explanation. Taking January 1937 as a dividing point, they show that Justice
Roberts’s voting on cases before this dividing point is statistically different from his voting
afterward. Id. at 72. As they observe, this pattern is what the traditional approach predicts—
the essence of the switch in time that saved nine. Unfortunately, their analysis has an
assumption wired in, which, while not undermining the empirics, affects the question of
whether the externalist explanation is the most plausible: they assume that the cases reaching
the Supreme Court are the same before and after January 1937. This assumption builds into
the analysis the central element of the controversy: traditionalists see cases as New Deal
cases, as if all were alike. Cushman contests this claim, as does Ernst, albeit more equivocally.
And, indeed, that the cases are different is the essence of the internalist claim.
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adapted by 1937 to the Court’s directions about how best to
configure a statute that would meet constitutional scrutiny.178
As Katznelson surveys this dialogue between the Court and
Congress, he remarks:
After the Hundred Days, congressional forms of dispute, debate,
and decision survived and thrived. . . . In all, the central place of
Congress was maintained. Even more, the crucial lawmaking role
that it undertook offered a practical answer to critics who thought
the days of legislative institutions had passed.179

Congress learned well the lessons imparted by the Supreme
Court in the NIRA cases. As a result, the blockbuster statutes
enacted later in the New Deal, especially the NLRA and securities
acts,180 represented a new model of regulatory legislation. It
synthesized the administrative and constitutional law and devised
a means by which an agency focused on novel problems might
accomplish a series of desired ends, including ending a century of
violence surrounding labor organization that at times seemed
unsolvable.181 These statutes represent a major innovation in
regulatory administration in administrative law. What was so truly
innovative in these statutes? Several key elements, each exemplars
of the modern regulatory state182:
Indeed, the main alternative hypothesis is the idea that the New Dealers adapted their
legislation to the concerns of the Supreme Court, hence, as we and others argue, legislation
was not the same across the New Deal. Furthermore, the chief moment dividing the two
periods is the NLRA, producing the very court case of the Ho and Quinn dividing line, Jones
& Laughlin Steel in 1937. Hence their method does not test whether the New Deal cases before
the Supreme Court evolved in a way that made them more acceptable to a majority of
the Court.
178. The connection between the Court’s “how-to” analysis and the structure of the
NLRA, SSA, and new AAA was noticed by commentators at the time. See, e.g., Oppenheimer,
supra note 148; Stern, supra note 109.
179. KATZNELSON, supra note 90, at 125.
180. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices,
95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2009); Barry Cushman, The Securities Laws and the Mechanics of Legal
Change, 95 VA. L. REV. 927 (2009).
181. See Margaret Levi, Tania Melo, Barry R. Weingast & Frances Zlotnick, Opening
Access, Ending the Violence Trap: Business, Government, & the National Labor Relations Act, in
ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE ROOTS OF DEVELOPMENT 331 (Naomi Lamoreaux &
John Wallis eds., 2017).
182. See, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 32, at 320–21 (“[A] delegation of power [to administrative
agencies] implies some limit [and] the availability of judicial review is, in our system and
under our tradition, the necessary premise of legal validity.”); VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 43
(contending that “[t]he administrative state is entirely the product of the constitutional

200

3.RODRIGUEZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

201

2/9/2021 9:08 PM

Engineering the Modern Administrative State
• The legislation does not delegate the choice of policy goals to
an agency. Instead, the legislation defines the policy goals of
the agency; the agency is to implement policies chosen by
Congress, not delegating authority to the private sector
nor leaving to the agency the essential prerogatives to choose
those goals;
• The legislation requires findings before making decisions,
including the issuance of regulations;
• Related to this, agency decisions must be made on the basis
of evidence;
• That the agency provide substantial evidence;
• The agency can appeal only to evidence presented as part of
the proceeding;
• Standard procedures in circumstance in which an agency was
developing a regulation includes (a) the announcement of a
proposed regulation, with (b) an opportunity for interested
persons to comment, and (c) an explanation of why this rule is
appropriate;
• Other requirements arose in instances when an agency sought
a formal proceeding.

The traditional administrative law instinct is to see these
familiar requirements as emerging from the APA in 1946. However,
these key elements of regulation were in fact hardwired directly
into the later New Deal statutes; and they were reinforced in key,
early Supreme Court decisions involving administrative decisionmaking.183 The APA was not created out of whole cloth from
nowhere; rather, it emerged from a developing body of

institutions of 1789” and that administrative agencies are constrained by “relevant
constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th
Amendments”); Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 939 (2011) (“American
administrative law is grounded in a conception of the relationship between reviewing courts
and agencies modeled on the relationship between appeals courts and trial courts in
civil litigation.”).
183. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (holding that if an
agency “action is based upon a determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of
the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived
the law”).
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administrative law and a new model of regulatory administration
embodied in the NLRA and other later New Deal statutes.184
F. Agencies, Adjudication, and Fidelity to Fair Procedure: The Seeds of
the New Administrative Law
In Crowell,185 the Supreme Court confirmed administrative
agency power to find facts so long as these findings were supported
by the weight of evidence. In doing so, the Court settled an
important issue that had been in doubt after its decision in Ben
Avon, that is, the agency’s latitude to exercise discretion. To be sure,
this power was not unqualified. In addition to requiring that the
decision be based on sufficient evidence, the Court demanded that
an Article III court exercise its supervisory role by deciding
questions of law de novo.186
The central lesson of Crowell was reinforced in cases decided
later in the New Deal. The Court’s opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States (1936),187 made clear that agencies were to be
given latitude under the rubric of the relevant statute to determine
facts (and, here, to set rates) and, second, that courts were given the
responsibility to make determinations about so-called
constitutional facts. In addition, agencies should adhere to
administrative procedures that ensured that agency decisions
would be supported by evidence, and, so long as this happened,
courts would give substantial weight to the agencies’ findings.188
St. Joseph Stock Yards is an important doctrinal statement and
one which evinces the political accommodation that the Court was
determined to implement as the New Deal emerged through a
steady stream of legislation.189 It elaborates on the principle so
184. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, The
Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); Shepherd,
supra note 21.
185. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).
186. See id. at 27; see also VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 23–30; Mark Tushnet, The Story of
Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES (V. Jackson & J.
Resnik eds., 2010); Richard Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988).
187. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
188. Id. at 50–53.
189. In his extended discussion of the St. Joseph Stock Yards case, Mark Tushnet contrasts
what he views as a formalistic approach to the judicial-agency relationship and the legal
realism of Justice Louis Brandeis, as reflected in his concurring opinion here.
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critical to the emerging administrative law that agency discretion
must be carried out consistent with sound administrative
procedures, procedures established by Congress and enforced by
the courts. And, interestingly, the doctrinal statement goes a step
further than Crowell in instructing courts to acknowledge agency
expertise by giving significant weight to agency findings.
In a series of cases beginning in 1936 and continuing for another
five years, the Court considered the performance of the
bureaucracy in the context of agricultural ratemaking. The
principal claim in the first of the four Morgan cases, argued in 1935
and decided in 1936, was that the Secretary of Agriculture failed to
give the party a “full hearing.” The Court agreed that this full
hearing must be before the Secretary, as he was the one with the
final decision, or at least there needed to be adequate evidence that
he had reviewed the evidence and the briefs.190 This issue continued
into the second Morgan case, decided in 1938. There, Chief Justice
Hughes emphasized in oral argument and in the final opinion the
essential role of adequate administrative procedure. A hearing
within the meaning of administrative law required that parties
have “a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing
party and to meet them.”191 Hughes’s opinion was a veritable brief
in favor of maintaining “proper standards” in hearings in order to
assure that the parties are treated fairly.
The Morgan cases, particularly the first two, reflect a Court
concerned to maintain reasonable agency procedures. It bears the
See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1598–1602 (“Hughes’s analysis . . . looked backward to a legal
world in which, as Brandeis put it, ‘rigid rules’ governed in an on-or-off fashion . . . .”). We
do not see this in the same way. Hughes was negotiating an accommodation of interest both
within his Court, a Court that had recently invalided big chunks of the NIRA and the AAA,
and one which had before it cases, such as the Morgan cases discussed at text accompanying
notes 190–194, and was faced with another case involving the exercising of administrative
power. Moreover, his extended discussion of the role and function of administrative agencies
in a comprehensive statute that gave the agency elaborate procedures to follow in order to
support an agency decision, was functional in a way that progressive advocates of the New
Deal agency would recognize and appreciate. Hughes recognizes, as Tushnet puts it,
“imperfections in agencies,” along with imperfections in courts. Tushnet, supra note 1, at
1602. In going a step further than in Crowell in acknowledging that a reviewing court would
give weight to the agency’s view of the legal issues at stake—or, at the very least, the
application of law to facts—Chief Justice Hughes was taking a more functional tack. What
Tushnet views as formalism, we view as a scrupulous effort to recognize and implement an
appropriate political accommodation.
190. Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
191. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938).
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strong imprint of a judiciary worried that procedural due process
would not be met except if and insofar as agencies would follow
the procedures spelled out in the statutes, with an interpretation
that would implement this “fair play” notion of agency
adjudication. As in Crowell and St. Joseph Stockyards, the Court was
not dealing with New Deal administrative agencies. However,
Chief Justice Hughes’s mention of “these multiplying agencies”
made clear that he had firmly in mind the emerging functions of
the New Deal bureaucracy.192 The Court was effective in preserving
its own significant prerogatives, not only with respect to judicial
review of agency findings of jurisdictional and constitutional fact
but also ensuring that agencies were meeting, as Hughes put it,
“those fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the
essence of due process.”193 The Court’s view of due process
permeated throughout much of the national governmental
policymaking process, not just agencies that would, a decade later,
become subject to the APA. Ernst summarizes well the political
accommodation underlying the Court’s approach when he writes:
“Americans decided they could avoid Tocqueville’s nightmare if
administration approximated the structure, procedures, and logic
of the judiciary.”194
These cases receive attention by administrative law scholars as
important examples of the Court’s acceptance of administrative
agency authority in adjudication and, with it, the steady
displacement of the judiciary-centric, common law quality of
administrative decision-making championed by Freund,
Frankfurter, Landis, and others.195 Yet, few see these cases as critical
to New Deal constitutionalism or as part of an omnibus, purposive
approach of the Supreme Court. We do see these cases as fitting
into the general story of political and legal accommodation.
Specifically, the Court was willing to permit agencies to function
192. Id. at 22.
193. Id. at 19.
194. ERNST, supra note 1, at 5. These decisions involving agency decision-making
illustrate well the political accommodation accomplished by the Supreme Court during this
critical New Deal period. As Professor Ernst describes it: “Judicializing administrative
procedure also addressed the interests of two vitally interested groups. Lawyers found that
expertise acquired in courts remained valuable in the new administrative state. Professional
politicians realized that due process kept executives from using administrative decisions as
their own form of individually targeted patronage.” Id. at 142.
195. See generally Vermeule, supra note 2.
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with broad powers so long as Congress had placed sufficient
bounds on the delegation, the agencies were acting consistent with
the terms of legislative delegation, and the procedures provided by
Congress were adequate to keep agencies within their proper
lanes.196 Hughes, writing for the Court in the Morgan cases,
emphasized the importance of fair play; and in Crowell and St.
Joseph Stockyards, he noted the value of expertise, exercised in
accordance with procedures that were conspicuously court-like
(“hearings,” “evidence”). Viewed against the background of the
seminal early New Deal delegation cases, including Panama
Refining, Schechter Poultry, and Carter Coal, these administrative
adjudication decisions illustrate the Court’s embrace of
congressional objectives, objectives which included widening the
sphere of administrative power and discretion, so long as agencies
had standards to guide their discretion and appropriate procedures
to maintain fair process and fidelity to the rule of law.
Equally, elected officials embraced the procedural standards
advocated by the courts as part of the price of constitutional
sanction of New Deal legislation.
The Court’s insistence on fair play and due process norms also
animated its decision in Chenery,197 decided in 1943. In Chenery, the
Court considered an order of the SEC under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935.198 The Court read this statute, and
the administrative process that it constructed, as requiring the
agency to base its order on the grounds upon which the record
discloses that the agency’s action was based.199 This was required,
announced Justice Frankfurter in his opinion for the Court, by “the
orderly functioning of the process of review.”200 The problem here
was not at all with the nature and scope of the agency’s powers—
as Frankfurter puts it, “we are not imposing any trammels on [the
agency’s] powers”—but with the exercise of administrative

196. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 976, 987 (1982) (“The principal concern of administrative law since the New Deal, in
short, has been to develop surrogate safeguards for the original protection afforded by
separation of powers and electoral accountability.”).
197. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
198. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 5, 49 Stat. 803, repealed by Energy
Policy Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 594.
199. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94–95.
200. Id. at 94.
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discretion and, more to the point, by the agency’s failure to engage
in appropriate procedures.201
In the second Chenery case, decided four years later, the Court
went to some length to make clear that agencies’ discretion and
prerogative was to be safeguarded by the Court.202 In a holding that
would become blackletter administrative law, the Court said that
the agency could proceed through an ad hoc (adjudicatory)
decision rather than a general rule.203 And this judgment, Justice
Murphy concluded in his opinion for the Court, “is the product of
administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the
problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible
treatment of the uncontested facts.”204 It is, in short, an example of
a judgment that “justifies the use of the administrative process.”205
In essence, the Court in Crowell and cases decided in the years
afterward was providing a how-to manual for administrative
agencies,206 this in parallel with its how-to manual for Congress to
follow in establishing the appropriate delegation of administrative
authority. Both elements are important, for they make clear what
the Court expects from administrative governance, one focused
carefully on choices made by Congress in statutory enactments
and the other focused on Congress also, but in the context of
agency decisions and the requirements they must meet to
withstand scrutiny.
201. Id. at 95.
202. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
203. Id. at 199–200.
204. Id. at 209.
205. Id.
206. Professor Kevin Stack insists that Chenery II can best be understood as a decision
whose linchpin―that is, the requirement that agencies engage in reasoned decisionmaking―is connected to the conditions for a suitable delegation under the Court’s
nondelegation doctrine. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE
L.J. 952, 981–92 (2007) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine provides a basis for courts to read the
Chenery principle, at least as a default rule of statutory construction, into delegations of
authority to act with the force of law.”). We agree with Professor Vermeule that this stretches
the analogy between a constitutional doctrine dealing with legislative power and an edict
about fair and reasonable administrative power, an edict not grounded in constitutional
rules. See VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 199. Nonetheless, the basic logic behind these two
doctrines have this in common: they are designed to limit the scope of agency discretion and
therefore navigate between a strong Progressive vision of agency independence on the one
hand and a more circumscribed function for agencies on the other. In this respect, they
illustrate well the political and legal accommodation reached during this key area in
American regulatory history.
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It is important, too, to see the way in which these holdings
provided a doctrinal diving board of sorts for a vision of
administrative agency deference, one that would take hold in the
years following Crowell207 and after the enactment of the APA in
1946.208 In his analysis of the administrative state evolving after
Crowell, Vermeule sees this as an inevitable part of the arc toward
deference, one whose seeds were planted in Crowell’s unstable
compromise between authority and restriction, between a robust
role for agencies and a protective role of courts.209 In a chapter
section labeled “The Collapse of Crowell,” Vermeule notes the ways
in which the Court’s insistence on a strong judicial role, and the rest
of what he calls the Hughes synthesis, has been abandoned.210
While there is much wisdom in these claims, it is too forwardlooking in that it takes a number of major post–New Deal
developments, including the Court’s major decisions in Chevron v.
Natural Resource Defense Council211 a half century later and the
expanded use of administrative rulemaking in the 1960s and
thereafter, as evidence that the citadel was shaky at its origin. In
contrast, viewed in the context of the problem needing to be solved
in the New Deal period and the decade afterward, the cases
beginning with Crowell and continuing through St. Joseph
Stockyards, Chenery, the Morgan cases, the agency statutory
interpretation cases including Skidmore,212 Gray,213 and Hearst,214
and even Universal Camera, decided five years after the enactment
of the APA, are examples of a Court grappling with administrative
207. This period after 1937, with its settlement of the major conflicts over congressional
and administrative power, and before the 1960s, when social regulation and new
administrative governance came to the center of the stage, has been somewhat neglected by
scholars. Important recent work that trains a studied spotlight on administrative
constitutionalism and administrative law in this post–New Deal period includes JOANNA
GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE
NEW DEAL (2014); Reuel E. Schiller, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law
and Administration in Postwar America, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 415 (2008). For broader historical
analyses of the period, see, for example, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE
20TH CENTURY (2002); KALMAN, supra note 2.
208. See McNollgast, supra note 184.
209. VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 24–37.
210. Id. at 34.
211. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
212. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
213. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
214. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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power and with the concern that agencies with wide decisionmaking discretion would result in poor, unfair administrative
action. This synthesis emerging from Crowell was indeed
influential, and, at least for a time, reflected well the balance struck
by the Court in the area of regulatory administration.
To be sure, this balance would be tested in the years after the
APA’s enactment. The history of modern administrative law,
defining modern to include the eighty years after the New Deal and
this judicial imprimatur on administrative power, reveals this
tension in a myriad of decisions and their consequences. In future
work, we will examine these developments. Spoiler alert: much of
this jurisprudence illustrates the continuing judicial-legislative
dialogue and the importance of accommodating the interests and
objectives of both branches.215
The Court’s holdings in these two clusters of constitutional
cases, one involving nondelegation and the other involving the
proper scope of agency adjudication, not only effectuate a political
accommodation which ensures the viability and vitality of the New
Deal administrative state, but they also presage decades of
administrative law. The administrative law which emerges from
the New Deal, and is reflected in lodestar cases such as Crowell, the
Morgan cases, and Chenery, points to a new, important dialogue
between the federal courts and administrative agencies. This
dialogue carries forward the project of tethering the bureaucracy to
the rule of law and to congressional policy, all the more so as
circumstances changed over the post WWII era. The enactment of
the APA, coming just a decade after Roosevelt’s reelection and the
Second New Deal, reveals this promise; and so, too, does a series of
critically important early administrative law cases, such as Skidmore
v. Swift and Universal Camera. We leave to future work a close
examination of how these strands of administrative law grow out
of this New Deal political accommodation.
G. An Accommodation of Interests
By way of summary, we have considered in context how and
why Congress sought to meet its three key objectives, that is,
215. See generally GRISINGER, supra note 207; Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered
Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the Founding to the Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV.
1699, 1733–44 (2019).
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exercising broader national power to deal with the imperative
of market integration, delegating policy implementation to
regulatory agencies in order to carry out a legislative mission, and,
finally, designing appropriate regulatory instruments to ensure
that agencies would implement congressional policy choices that
would stick.
We see a dialogue and bargaining between the Supreme Court
and political officials over the technology of administration. The
early New Deal legislation was hastily written and paid
inadequate—indeed, in some cases, no—attention to designing
agencies in a manner consistent with previous constitutional
rulings by the Supreme Court. Consistent with both this view and
the traditional scholarly view, the Supreme Court rejected many of
these laws, including the flagship NIRA. But the Supreme Court
further outlined not just the defects in the inadequate structure and
process of the legislation, it also explained the structure and process
necessary for regulatory laws to be constitutional. These cases led
New Dealers to search for commonalities in the successful
regulatory legislation delegating power to agencies.216

216. There is a way to put this thesis in more conventionally PPT terms. The logic is as
follows: The conventional approaches to these issues fails to make the key distinction
between the coalition on the Court against the New Deal and the pivot. It may well be that
the four horsemen on the Court were so abidingly hostile to the New Deal that no legislation
delegating authority to agencies would satisfy them. In particular, despite the how-to aspects
of the key anti–New Deal decisions, they would not support legislation reflecting those
principles. But, as non-pivotal coalition members in a 5-4 environment, their views do not
matter. Instead, the key is Roberts as the universally acknowledged swing voter. As swing
voter, the critical decisions in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry were likely to reflect
his views.
This view implies that, were Congress to pass legislation consistent with the how-to
strictures, a decisive majority of 5-4 (Hughes and Roberts plus the three dissenters in the
anti–New Deal cases) would approve the legislation. This is exactly what happened in Jones
& Laughlin Steel. The majority approving the NLRA in 1935 has generally been interpreted
through the lens of the political story and its emphasis on the “switch in time.” Doubtless
this account has important insights into the Supreme Court’s treatment of New Deal
legislation beginning in January of 1937, especially with respect to the Commerce Clause,
which the four horsemen took as a strict, binding constraint on congressional legislation.
Nonetheless, it is not obvious that this holds with respect to the decision about the NLRA,
which follows the blueprint and hence the Court’s—read, pivotal coalition members, Justices
Hughes and Roberts’s—implicit bargaining offer to accept legislation that followed the
blueprint. As Cushman suggests, the issues before the Court, Justices Hughes and Roberts
in particular, in 1937 in Jones & Laughlin Steel materially differed from those facing
Roberts and the Court in 1935 in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry. Cushman, supra
note 1, at 37–38.
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Recalling the standard narratives of constitutional law in this
era, the traditional externalist account of the New Deal–era stresses
Congress’s interests (along with the President’s) and sees the story
as one of the Liberal Democratic agenda pushed by the President
and Congress vanquishing their foes thanks to threats of courtpacking and impactful carrots and sticks. So, naturally, this theory
focuses on the Congress side of the ledger and sees the matter as
one of conquest rather than accommodation. The externalist
perspective also sees the constitutional controversy as a zero-sum
game with only one winner: the recalcitrant Court or FDR and the
New Deal. This assumption then structures the case-by-case
analysis trying to read each new case, beginning with Blaisdell217
and Nebbia,218 as evidence for the Court’s ultimate judgment. The
internalist perspective dwells principally on the courts and sees the
matter as one of the Supreme Court sticking to its doctrinal guns
and crafting constitutional rules which first restrict and then later
empower Congress to carry out its regulatory in the form designed
by the political branches. Viewed in this light, the only real
accommodation is Congress’s to the courts, that is, the imperative
that Congress have fidelity to legal doctrine, doctrine decided by
judges more or less following The Law.
Revisionists, such as Cushman, Ernst, and White, point in a
different direction, much of which is guided by the internalist
direction: the nature of legislation and doctrine produced by the
New Deal evolved in a manner sought by the courts.
By contrast to these narratives, and building on the revisionists’
observations, we argue that Congress and the courts worked
purposively to reach an accommodation of interests and of
strategies, one which would ensure that Congress could implement
its objectives consistent with the needs of this emerging national
economy while likewise ensuring the judiciary’s interests would be
ensured. Significantly, both institutions achieved a major portion of
their goals over the course of FDR’s first term in initiating the
accommodation (counting the Jones & Laughlin Steel in January of
1937 as technically still part of FDR’s first term, which then ended
in March of 1937). Congress succeeded in creating novel, workable
regulatory instruments, ones that would enable its legislative
217. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
218. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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objectives to flourish. Moreover, they well understood that the
processes of regulatory administration and the performance of
agencies would be an iterative process and that strategies of
oversight and control would be dynamic and remain so.
In our view, the constitutional controversy was not a zero-sum
game, but positive sum. Led by the Supreme Court, the judiciary
got what it wanted in two important respects: First, the justices
succeeded in creating a template for proper delegation through a
how-to manual of sorts. Our discussion above of the NIRA and
NLRA cases examined this template in detail. And, second, the
Justices were able to create a politically acceptable rubric for
checking and balancing administrative and legislative power and
also ensuring that judicial power and prerogative would be
respected, this through the imaginative configuration of a new
administrative law. Indeed, administrative law is the neglected part
of this big story of the New Deal synthesis. The Court made clear
in a number of cases during and soon after the New Deal that
agency decision-making would need to follow guidelines of
procedural regularity and rationality. True, the contours of these
requirements would be worked out over the course of the next four
decades of administrative law, culminating in key “hard look” era
cases of the 1970s and 80s.219 But the New Deal–era cases were
critical in forging a scheme of delegation, regulatory discretion, and
judicial control.
The success of the courts in fashioning the process and limits on
the administrative process did not come at the expense of Congress
and the President, as the zero-sum traditional externalist
perspective holds. Instead, Congress—especially in drafting the
NLRA—demonstrated that it could create a powerful new
regulatory agency to achieve desired political ends in an
administrative system allowing congressional, not judicial,
determination of policy ends.
With respect to the commerce power under the Constitution,
we see how the Court, in cases such as the railroad labor cases
of the 1920s, created a doctrine which established the conditions
under which Congress could press forward with key efforts
to improve market integration and limit the states’ ability to

219. See generally EDLEY, supra note 108 (describing “hard look”-era cases).
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balkanize commerce.220 In these developments, the Court acted as
a partner with Congress to facilitate a measured response to a
predicament of pre–New Deal federalism. At nearly the same time,
however, the Court expressed consternation with how Congress
was treating businesses affected by strong regulatory authority. In
Ben Avon, the Court invoked a rationale that presaged the logic of
its administrative adjudication decisions and, in particular, the
Court’s concern that fundamental fairness and a modicum of due
process be maintained where agencies asserted power and affected
private economic interest.221 The point here is not to valorize these
cases from the 1920s, but instead to see them through a positive
political theory lens as efforts by the Court to empower Congress
while also establishing limits on the tactics and techniques used by
Congress to guide agency decision-making.
We see from the Court’s approach to the Commerce Clause how
Congress adapted in developing new regulatory legislation. And,
likewise, we see how Congress developed regulatory structures
and procedures to meet the Court’s concerns with adjudicatory
fairness and administrative discretion. Much of the dynamic work
of both Congress and the courts during this era could be
characterized as experimental; that is, Congress was trying out new
strategies and the Court was developing new doctrines. Commerce
Clause jurisprudence gets a spotlight in the New Deal and post–
New Deal era as the Court decides lodestar cases establishing a
structure that shapes and importantly broadens national power to
deal with a specialized and increasingly integrated economy. From
the heyday of the Progressive Era, and its creation of the first major
national regulatory agencies, and through the initial depths of the
Depression and up to the New Deal, the Court had been fashioning
doctrine about regulation. Yet, constitutional law scholars too
often neglect the doctrine in the modern constitutional canon,
even though it is critically important in understanding these
experiments and how the two branches shape the interests of
each other.
We should not lose sight of the big picture. All three branches
of the national government were working through difficult matters
220. This state holds in particular for railway labor legislation, including the National
Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456, and the Railway Labor Act of
1926, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577.
221. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 290–91 (1920).
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of constitutional theory. The issues were political, to be sure, but
the struggle was not purely about politics. Legislators and judges,
in order to develop structures and strategies that would take root,
needed to figure out the proper place of regulatory administration
in a scheme of constitutional government that insisted upon the
separation of powers and worried about administrative
discretion—in its rationale, its shape, and ultimately its impact on
the well-being of individuals and industry. The fundamental
challenge was how to square new technologies of governance with
our embedded commitment to the rule of law and democracy. And
the mounting of this challenge required a dynamic interaction
between two critically important, and also willful, institutions of
the national government.
We view these key political episodes, unfolding over the course
of a dozen years or so, from the beginning of the New Deal and up
to the enactment of the APA, as revealing a significant
accommodation—a political accommodation—between these two
branches of government. The trials and tribulations of Congress
and the Court during this tough period of American regulatory
history yielded an accommodation—in game theoretic terms, an
equilibrium—that ensured that the New Deal agency and the
modern administrative state would become more or less
entrenched. Moreover, it would be, at least from the perspective of
Congress and the courts, successful, meaning it allowed the
Congress and the President to meet the demands of a complex,
integrated economy, as they saw it, and also the demands of
fairness and rationality in administrative agency decision-making
and therefore one embodiment of the rule of law extended to cover
agency policymaking.
CONCLUSION
“[T]he American administrative state has been
neither Tocqueville’s nightmare nor Vedder’s Good
Administration. Its twentieth-century creators did not let
the risk of misgovernment keep them from expanding the
state to make life better, and they were not fooled by a vision
of apolitical expertise into thinking that government would
control itself. Instead, working under the particular
political and professional conditions of their day, they
213
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imaginatively reworked the law they had to create the
government they needed.”222
The New Deal agency resulted from deliberate political
strategy, negotiation, and accommodation between elected officials
and the Supreme Court. It is the product of a complex process that
involves key decisions by purposive legislators, a determined
president, and attentive federal judges. Each of these players acted
within and through a constitutional framework, including an
architecture forged by text, by doctrine, and by institutions that
enable and constrain political choice. Too, these officials were
embedded in a legal structure, one which consists of barriers made
by not only parchment, but by widely shared and understood legal
norms and principles.
On FDR’s election, neither the shape nor the foundation of the
regulatory state was at all clear. This moment was the dawn of
administrative law; the APA was many years away still, and its
contents were hard to conceive in any meaningful detail in early
1933. The Great Depression and the failures of the laissez-faire
capitalism to deal with myriad economic, health, and safety issues
forced the president, members of Congress, and also the judiciary
to confront a wide range of new regulatory problems for which no
adequate administrative structures or principles existed. To be
sure, administrative agencies existed—indeed, the quintessential
federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
was a half century old by the time of the New Deal, and the Federal
Trade Commission was two decades old. However, the architecture
of regulatory administration was fairly crude, and the existential
dilemma of how best to cabin administrative discretion without
sacrificing the advantages of the bureaucracy remained elusive.
Moreover, the role and function of the courts remained in tension
with the New Deal agency model. Administrative agencies were
becoming a vital, and steadily enduring, feature of American
political life. Yet, there were key issues that remained to be
resolved. And the resolution of these issues would require
participation—and, ultimately, collaboration—by all three
branches of the federal government.
The New Deal agency did not emerge from the head of Zeus,
and it did not gain traction through the unmediated efforts of legal
222. ERNST, supra note 1, at 146.
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scholars who championed broad administrative agency discretion
during the New Deal period. Rather, it was constructed by
purposive governmental officials, each working to protect their
own political interests and developing strategies which would
ensure that their goals would be achievable. These efforts yielded a
political accommodation that got important regulatory statutes first
through Congress and then through the courts. This process was
messy and turbulent. Some of the most important legislation of the
famous first One Hundred Days—notably, the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933223—cannot be viewed as anything but
a wholly unsatisfactorily model foundation and constitutional
administrative statute.224
Understanding this political accommodation during this key
constitutional epoch requires that we understand both the shape of
regulatory administration and the impact of law and legal doctrine.
The New Deal constitutional controversies were not a zero-sum
game in which, as has been insisted upon by many scholars, the
Supreme Court caved in 1937 to political pressure. Instead, the New
Deal’s success reflected the invention of administrative law that
satisfied the Supreme Court as to the constitutional requirements
of due process while allowing adequate political and policy
flexibility for elected officials. With this political accommodation,
the elected branches retained control over policy; and the courts
retained control over the requirements of due process and decisionmaking consistent with the rule of law. (For the purposes of our
analysis here, we express no opinion about the benefits or costs of
this judicial strategy). This political accommodation portends
struggles in the post-new Deal period, struggles which ultimately
define concretely the modern place of agencies and administrative
discretion in a complex republic, a republic simultaneously
committed to effective social and economic policy and to the
rule of law.

223. The National Industrial Recovery Act was the most far reaching of the several
initiatives crafted quickly by the 80th Congress in this First Hundred Days. Indeed, Roosevelt
stated that “[h]istory will probably record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most
important and far-reaching Legislation ever created by the American Congress.” NATHAN
MILLER, F.D.R.: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 318 (1991).
224. See, e.g., KATZNELSON, supra note 90, at 8 (explaining that during the New Deal
era, “[n]o decisions could be made that were not influenced by practical and
moral compromise”).
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We know that the story does not end with Jones & Laughlin Steel
and, a decade later, the enactment of the APA. Agencies acted in
important ways in the next several decades. Some of these actions
reveal the ways in which administrative officials push the envelope
of congressional choice. So, for example, James Landis expresses
doubts by the beginning of the 1960s, manifest in his famous report
to President Kennedy, about how agencies are functioning.225 Early
public choice theory alerts us to the interest group-fueled wealth
transfers and “budget maximizing” bureaus. Congress responds in
large part to these actions by enacting more prolix statutes, statutes
which create even more elaborate procedures to guide agency
decision-making within their jurisdiction. But struggles persist
about how best to negotiate among willful agencies, political
brokers, and legal standards.226 The courts get into this struggle in
earnest in the 1960s and 1970s under their APA authority to review
informal rulemaking (by then the modal device for making
regulatory policy). The focus shifts from the Supreme Court, which,
save for a few key interventions (e.g., Overton Park,227 State Farm,228
Vermont Yankee,229 Chevron230), leaves the lion’s share of the matters
governing administrative action to the lower federal courts. In later
work, we will look at these developments, and also some of the
leading scholarly works on the emergence and evolution of modern
administrative law, arriving at a conclusion consistent with our
basic thesis, and that is that Congress and the courts reach a
political accommodation among competing interests.

225. See the extended discussion in THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION
206–08 (1984).
226. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
227. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
228. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
229. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
230. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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